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“Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in
the Judicial Appointment Process
E. Stewart Moritz*
“I don't want to take this time to engage in statistical judo
on judicial nominees.”1
-Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
“We can prove anything with statistics. They can prove anything with
statistics; we can prove anything with statistics.”2
-Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)
“Republicans and Democrats can‟t give you the facts.”3
-Uncle Tupelo
I. INTRODUCTION
Until relatively recently, most legal scholarship on the judicial
confirmation process, and indeed most public interest in the subject, has
centered on highly public partisan fights over Supreme Court
nominations.4 There has been plenty to consider on that score, back to the
earliest days of the Republic. Famously, George Washington‟s 1795
nomination of John Rutledge to replace John Jay as Chief Justice was
scuttled by partisan politics, despite Rutledge‟s confirmation for an initial

*
Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. B.A., Yale; J.D., Vanderbilt. I thank
Sarah Cravens, Brant Lee, Molly O‟Brien, Elizabeth Reilly, and Tracy Thomas for insightful comments
that improved the text and for encouragement that inspired it to be finished. Sincere thanks also to
Stephen Burbank, Michael Gerhardt, and Elliot Slotnick for comments on a draft of this piece. Finally,
thanks to Maura O‟Shea for pretty much everything.
1
148 CONG. REC. S121 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See also 147 CONG.
REC. S13116 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“As everyone here knows, I do not
like to engage in the typical statistics judo that seems to be intrinsic to this issue.”).
2
147 CONG. REC. S10673 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Reid).
3
UNCLE TUPELO, We‘ve Been Had, on ANODYNE (Sire Records 1993). See also Noelle Straub,
Judicial Gridlock in Senate: Same Story, Different Setting, THE HILL, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1 (“With rising
concern over the vacancy rate, both Leahy and Hatch, now the ranking members, cite different statistics
to bolster their argument that they treated judicial nominees fairly.”).
4
See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 1 (Yale 1997) (“The selection of a Supreme Court justice is front-page
news . . . . But throughout American history we find little such national attention given to the selection
of lower federal court judges.”); cf. id. at 308-09 (citing mid-1980‟s nominations of Jefferson B.
Sessions III to a district judgeship and Daniel A. Manion to the Seventh Circuit as “the first instance of
a major national media campaign to defeat lower-court nominations”).
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seat as Associate Justice on the Supreme Court four years earlier.5 During
the 1800s, fights over Supreme Court nominees were common, and
twenty-five of 108 Court nominees were not confirmed.6 In 1969 and
1970, two successive nominees to the Court by President Nixon, Clement
Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell, were rejected after highly
publicized hearings.7 More recently, President Reagan‟s nomination of
Robert Bork and President George H.W. Bush‟s (“Bush I‟s”) nomination
of Justice Clarence Thomas have garnered enormous scholarly and public
interest.8 In perhaps the starkest example yet of partisan attention paid to
Supreme Court nominations, interest groups spent nearly $2.5 million
dollars on television advertising in the latest “campaign” for the
confirmation of Samuel Alito to the Court.9
However, the confirmation process for the lower courts, and especially
the issue of Senate delay in confirming lower-court judges, was not
discussed much in the academy or the mainstream media until relatively
recently.10 Significant interest in confirmation delay only arose in the last
two years of the Bush I presidency, in 1991 and 1992, when Democrats
had control of the Senate, and again in the period following the 1994
elections, when Republicans took back the Senate and moved to block

5
See Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5 (1991); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, The Constitution, and The Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1500-01 (1992)
(discussing the rejection of Rutledge and other Supreme Court nominees due to political
considerations). See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
(2000); Paul A. Freund, Appointment Of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1146 (1988) (examining the historical role of politics in the Supreme Court confirmation process).
6
Freund, supra note 5, at 1147.
7
Id. at 1155-56.
8
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988);
Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary On The Nomination And Confirmation Of Justice
Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1992); Calvin R. Massey, supra note 5; Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal For Reforming The Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1577 (1992).
9
Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, TV Advertising Data Reveals Group Adopting
Different Strategies in Alito Confirmation Battle (Jan. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/press_detail.asp?key=100&subkey=34246.
10
See Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The Senate‘s Role in the Appointment of
Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 25 (2002) (“[W]hen the Senate considers a nomination to the
Supreme Court, it is engaged in an act of obvious national importance, attracting substantial public
interest, and its members therefore must be careful at least to seem to act responsibly. Appointments to
the lower federal courts have not, for most of our history, engaged remotely similar public interest.”);
Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13, 13
(2002) (“Federal judicial selection, at least for the lower courts, has been a relatively invisible focal
point for public interest until recent years.”).

2006]

Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process

343

certain of President Clinton‟s lower-court judicial nominations.11 Even
then, confirmation delays in the Bush I era were seen at the time as at least
as much of an executive branch as a Senate problem.12 And “common
knowledge” traced the Republican actions during the Clinton period to the
failed Bork nomination and the difficult Clarence Thomas confirmation.13
In other words, Republican “inaction” was often seen as retribution for
previous actions, rather than as a separate political strategy of the Senate.14
Still, deliberate Senate delay was a growing background issue among
scholars beginning in the early 1990s, and eventually the issue of inaction
11
Pre-1994 commentary specifically addressing the issue of delay seems naïve in today‟s
atmosphere of scorched-earth partisan politics:

Moreover, while the executive branch has as much time as it needs to study a
person before appointing her, the Senate has little time to act: once the President
has nominated someone to fill a vacancy, the Senate cannot delay its decision for
long without appearing irresponsible. Even if the Senate did mobilize its
resources, study the nominee, and decide to reject her, it would have to repeat the
process all over again with another nominee who was known to the
Administration but not to the Senators. In theory, the Senate could establish a
duplicate bureaucracy and investigate each nominee to the lower courts as
thoroughly as it wished. But the expense, and the political costs of the delay,
would be prohibitive.
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1508.
12
An interesting 1989 article by Professor Daniel J. Meador examined delay in the confirmation of
federal judges, but focused more on delays in the executive branch nomination process: “Although
[from 1979 to 1988 there were] some egregious delays by the Senate, the major delays lie at the prenomination stage and have to be laid at the door of the executive authorities.” Daniel J. Meador,
Unacceptable Delays in Judicial Appointments, 6 J.L. & POL. 7-9 (1989). See also Kim Dayton,
Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 ST. JOHN‟S L. REV.
757, 766 n.48 (1993) (“The [Administrative Office of the U.S. Court]‟s statistics suggest that, at least
in the past decade, most of the time lapse between the occurrence of a vacancy and the confirmation of
a new district judge is attributable to the executive branch although the congressional share has
increased in the last couple of years.”); Editorial, Delay in Filling Federal Judicial Vacancies, 74
JUDICATURE 64, 64 (1990) (overlooking intentional delays by the Senate, and instead concluding that
“it appears that selection priorities of and criteria used within the DOJ, the Senate and the White House
contribute most to prolonging the process”).
13
See Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing ―Despise and
Resent‖ With ―Advice and Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001). See also GERHARDT, supra note
5, at 77, 355 n.83 (collecting sources); Peter Grier, Why Senate Roughs Up Some Cabinet Nominees,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 19, 1997, at 3 (“Republicans date the coarsening of the confirmation
process to Reagan-era nominee Robert Bork, whose chance to sit on the Supreme Court was defeated
by a Democratic-controlled Senate in 1987.”); Walter Shapiro, Happy Days Are Here Again, But Not
For Liberal Judges, USA TODAY, May 16, 1997, at 2A (“Gone are the traditions of bipartisan comity
in a GOP Senate that still seems bent on exacting vengeance for the rejection of Robert Bork's
nomination to the Supreme Court a decade ago.”).
14
Helen Dewar, Polarized Politics, Confirmation Chaos; Retribution Appears Evident in
Nominations Since the Late 1980s, WASH. POST, May 11, 2003, at A5 (“Republicans believed
Democrats had mistreated Supreme Court nominees Robert H. Bork, who was rejected by the Senate in
1987, and Clarence Thomas, who was narrowly confirmed in 1991, both after bitter fights. So they
zeroed in on Clinton‟s nominees.”).
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in the confirmation process moved to the forefront of public debate.
Commentary on the subject began to pick up in the mid-1990s, and this has
led to some thoughtful articles on the constitutional obligations of the
Senate and Executive.15 Delay in the confirmation process was a frequent
complaint of liberal commentators and senators during the last six years of
the Clinton presidency.16 The issue was quiet during the first months
following the election of George W. Bush (“Bush II”) in 2000, largely
because the president enjoyed Republican control of the Senate.17 Senator
James Jeffords‟s switch from Republican to Independent in May 2001,
however, put Democrats in charge of the upper house. Complaints of

15
See generally GERHARDT, supra note 5; GOLDMAN, supra note 4; G. Calvin MacKenzie, The
Presidential Appointment Process: Historical Development, Contemporary Operations, Current
Issues, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1996); G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997 (1998); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The
Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 1 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege &
Power The Senate‘s Role in the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002); Brannon P.
Denning, The ―Blue Slip‖: Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001); Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue
Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218 (2002); Denning, supra note 13; Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the
Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting
Presidential Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Perspective, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1359 (1997); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 467 (1998); Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the
Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251
(2003); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton‘s First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross,
80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton‘s
Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228 (2001); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick,
Clinton‘s Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Sheldon
Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal Court
Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695 (2003) [hereinafter Goldman, Unpicking];
William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees During the Senate Confirmation
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119 (2001); Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the
New Millenium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587 (2003); Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on
Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13 (2002); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996). Cf. Bob Dylan, The Times They Are a Changin‘, on THE
TIMES THEY ARE A CHANGIN‟ (Columbia 1964) (“Come Senators, Congressmen, please heed the call.
Don‟t stand in the doorway, don‟t block up the hall. For he that gets hurt will be he who has stalled—
there‟s a battle outside and it‟s ragin‟. It‟ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls, for the
times, they are a changin‟.”).
16
See, e.g., Brian Blomquist, Senate‘s Adjournment Leaves Judgeship Nominees in Limbo:
Democrats Decry ―Miserable Record,” WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at A3.
17
The Senate was actually split fifty-fifty, with Republicans chairing committees to reflect the Vice
President‟s ability to break a tie on any Senate vote. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Vice President of the
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).
See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Moreover, given the timing of judicial nominations and
confirmation hearings, there is no cause for complaint about Senatorial delay at the start of a new
presidential administration, as the first nominations are usually not sent to the Senate until July or
August. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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delay surfaced nearly immediately, and continued intermittently for the
next year and a half.18
This article first briefly summarizes the issues that arise in the lowercourt judicial confirmation process, and examines how the issues differ
from those that arise during the confirmation of Supreme Court justices.
The article considers constitutionally-based differences as well as practical
differences in Senate and Executive behavior that have developed during
more than two centuries of judicial confirmations.
The body of this article offers a chronological history and critique of the
rhetoric of both Republican and Democratic senators in discussing lowercourt confirmations during the 107th Congress. For reasons discussed
below, this congressional session, spanning the years 2001 to 2002, was a
particularly interesting one for examining the lower-court nominations
process.19
Much the rhetoric of the 107th Congress relies upon
comparisons of then-current nomination success rates to earlier judicial
confirmation rates from the Carter, Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton
presidencies. Thus, by carefully analyzing the claims of senators
concerning judicial appointments during the first Congressional term of
Bush II‟s presidency, the article is able to survey more than twenty years of
Senate behavior with respect to lower-court confirmations. In doing so,
the article identifies a number of “confirmation process fallacies” that
senators have repeatedly relied upon in their efforts to score political points
on confirmation issues. It also explains some “confirmation process
relevancies”20 in hopes that future debates can be grounded in important
considerations rather than trivial and irrelevant ones. Because the lower18
See discussion infra note 105 and accompanying text. Following the mid-term elections of 2002,
when Republicans narrowly regained control of the Senate, the controversy surrounding lower-court
appointments reached perhaps its highest level of national prominence. The Bush II administration
made a concerted effort to raise the issue, and there was discussion in the Senate and in the mainstream
press about the propriety of “judicial filibusters” and about constitutional options for changing the
confirmation process. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (“I have proposed a protocol which would establish a timetable: So many days after a
nominee is submitted by the President there ought to be a Judiciary Committee hearing. So many days
later there ought to be action by the Judiciary Committee, voted up or down; and, if voted up, so many
days later there ought to be floor consideration for confirmation by the entire Senate-with that not being
an ironclad schedule.”); Brennan Center, supra note 9 (citing $3.3 million in television advertisement
spending on “Nuclear Option”). The post-2002 period of controversy is beyond the scope of this
article.
19
See discussion infra § III.
20
See Samuel Langhorne Clemens (“Mark Twain”), N. AM. REV., July 10, 1895 (“Conversations
consisted mainly of irrelevancies, with here and there a relevancy, a relevancy with an embarrassed
look, as not being able to explain how it got there.”) (quoted in Oxford English Dictionary Online at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/
50201986?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=relevancy&first=1&max_to_show=10).
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court “confirmation mess”21 is sure to return to prominence in the
Democrat-controlled Senate that will be constituted in early 2007, and
following the 2008 presidential elections and beyond, the author hopes that
the article will help establish a baseline for arguments about delays in the
confirmation process, particularly when the White House and Senate are
held by different political parties.
Finally, the article offers some brief thoughts on which procedural
aspects of the current judicial confirmation process likely contribute most
to the problem of delay, and whether anything can, or even should, be done
to modify those procedures.
II. THE LOWER-COURT CONFIRMATION PROCESS
A. Differences Between the Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices and
Lower-Court Judges
The differences between Supreme Court and lower-court confirmations
begin with the language of the Constitution. First, lower federal courts
may not need to exist at all, since the Constitution only provides for “such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”22 The history of the United States Circuit Courts provides an
illustration of this point. With the passage of the first Judiciary Act in
1789, Congress created thirteen United States District Courts judgeships,
along with a six-justice United States Supreme Court,23 but Congress did
not then provide for the appointment of separate Circuit Court judges.
Instead, each of three geographically-based circuits was staffed with two
“circuit riding” justices of the Supreme Court and a local District Court
judge. While the number of District Court judges was gradually increased
during the following decade, the first separate United States Circuit Court
judgeships, eighteen in number, were not created until 1801.24 And those
circuit court positions, established by an outgoing Federalist majority in
Congress in an attempt to strengthen the centralized federal government,
were abolished the following year by a new Jeffersonian-Republican
21

See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988).
See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”). Of course, much has been written about whether Congress could eliminate all federal
lower-court jurisdiction, but that argument is well beyond the scope here.
23
1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789).
24
Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89 (Feb. 13, 1801). President John Adams‟ appointments during
the waning days of his administration of “midnight judges” to fill the new positions created by the
Judiciary Act of 1801 led to the Marbury v. Madison litigation, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22
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majority in Congress.25 No other circuit court judgeship existed until 1855,
when the single-judge Circuit Court of California was created,26 and that
court was also subsequently abolished, in 1863.27 The country remained
without separate circuit court judgeships until 1869, when judges were
appointed for each of the nine then-existing federal circuits.28 In 1891,
those circuits were replaced by nine new “United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals,”29 later renamed the United States Courts of Appeals.30 The
combined number of District Court and Court of Appeals positions has
risen since then from a total of fifty-six to 830.
In addition to the fact that lower federal courts may not need to exist at
all, the constitutionally-required procedure governing appointment and
confirmation of lower-court judges is arguably different than that for
Supreme Court justices. Article II, Section 2, clause 2 provides that the
President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Though there is much debate on this point, one reading of the
appointments clause —and I would argue the most persuasive reading—is
that “all other Officers” is the referent for “such inferior Officers.” Under
this reading of the text, lower-court judges might be nominated by the
courts or cabinet heads, rather than the president.31 The constitutional
25
Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. In Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), a Federalistdominated Supreme Court found the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 constitutional.
26
Act of Mar. 2, 1855, 10 Stat. 631 (“[T]o Establish a Circuit Court of the United States in and for
the State of California”).
27
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 794 (“[T]o provide Circuit Courts for the Districts of California and
Oregon . . . .”).
28
Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44 (Apr. 10, 1869).
29
Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (Mar. 3, 1891).
30
62 Stat. 869, 870 (June 25, 1948).
31
See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View Of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 235 n.103 (1985) (“An argument could be made that lower
federal judges might be „inferior Officers‟ whose appointment could be vested by Congress in other
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scheme establishing the federal courts, detailed above, supports this
reading of the clause: Congress should have more power over lower-court
nominations, and lower-court judges should therefore be considered
inferior officers, because Congress has the ability to eliminate the positions
altogether under the Constitution. The same cannot be said for positions
specifically enumerated in the appointments clause.
The debate at this point is truly academic, however. Whether or not the
power to nominate and appoint lower-court judges must be held by the
president, the president has exercised such power since the creation of the
lower federal courts in 1789.32 Still, the practice of nominating lower court
judges has always differed practically from the Supreme Court nomination
process,33 though the differences have perhaps diminished in recent
times.34

Article III judges.”); David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 482 (2005) (“[T]he Appointments Clause confers on
Congress the power to determine which offices, apart from those enumerated in the text of the clause
itself, require Senate confirmation.”); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges--Appointment, Supervision, and
Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 499-529 (1930) (laying
out the argument for lower-court judges as inferior officers in exhaustive detail); Paul Taylor, Filling
Judicial Vacancies and Strengthening the Separation of Powers Through the Appointments Clause: A
Legislative Proposal, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 227 (2003) (arguing that lower-court judges are
inferior officers); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273, 323
(1989) (detailing textual reasons why lower-court judges need not be subject to the advice and consent
requirement that applies to Supreme Court justices). But see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 275 n.103 (1992)
(arguing that lower-court judges are not “inferior officers”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out
The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 565 n.49 (1995) (book review) (same).
32
1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789). The 1789 Judiciary Act made no provisions for appointment of
lower-court judges, leaving the default advice and consent procedure in place. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 456 n.1 (1833):
Whether the Judges of the inferior courts of the United States are . . . inferior
officers . . . is a point, upon which no solemn judgment has ever been had. The
practical construction has uniformly been, that they are not such inferior
officers. And no act of congress prescribes the mode of their appointment
(emphasis added).
Justice Souter has cited this passage for the proposition that inferior court judges are not inferior
officers under the Constitution. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 807 n.232 (1999)
(noting this issue without taking a position on the Constitution‟s construction). Congress has
formalized the respective roles of the Senate and President for lower court judges by statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 44(a) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, circuit
judges for the several circuits . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, district judges for the several judicial districts . . . .”).
33
On the effectiveness of the Supreme Court appointment process, see Shartel, supra note 31, at
486:
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From the earliest years of the United States, although judicial
nomination power has resided in the executive branch, senators have
played a major role in giving “advice” to the president on potential judicial
nominees within each senator‟s home state. The practice may have arisen
from the early days in which Supreme Court justices spent the bulk of their
time providing lower federal court functions for specific geographic areas.
Because seats on the Court became associated with particular regions, the
senators from a given region sought to assert a controlling influence in the
process for filling that region‟s seat.35 Senators also sought influence over
other locally-based federal positions.36 The Senate as a whole enforced the
practice of giving “advice” to the president by refusing to confirm to
federal positions those who were not approved by their home-state
senators. As explored more fully below, this practice of “senatorial
courtesy” has changed through the years, but its current manifestation is
still an important consideration in lower-court appointments.
Especially for District Court judges, until recently the senators for the
state in which a vacancy was located provided the president with the names
of possible nominees, and the same senators retained informal “veto”
power over the final confirmation.37 This was especially true for senators
Presidential appointment of Supreme Court justices, by and with the consent of
the Senate, has worked well enough. It is far from clear that a better way of
choosing these justices could be found even if the Constitution were to be
amended. In making these important appointments both the President and the
Senate assume that responsibility which, by the framers of the Constitution, they
were intended to assume. The dignity and power of the Supreme Court, the need
for ability and fairness in its members, are so deeply appreciated that the
President and Senate are apt to scrutinize carefully the qualifications of
prospective appointees thereto.
34
See Burbank, supra note 10, at 27 (“In any event, the result has been, or so it seems, that more
and more nominations to the federal bench are now treated as if they were nominations to the Supreme
Court . . . .”).
35
Freund, supra note 5, at 1148 (“Thus parochialism combined with partisanship to shape
appointments to the Court.”).
36
William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 642 (1987) (“Only three months into its first
term, the Senate established the precedent of „senatorial courtesy‟ by rejecting a highly qualified
nominee for a naval position in Savannah because the two senators from Georgia preferred a different
candidate.”).
37
Kenneth C. Sears, The Appointment Of Federal District Judges, 25 ILL. L. REV. 54, 54-55 (1930)
(“It is believed that today for all practical purposes in many if not most instances the senators from
each state are really making the nominations to the federal district courts.”). See also Shartel, supra
note 31, at 488:

Appointments of inferior judges and promotions to the circuit courts of appeal
are dictated today by the senators from states where the vacancies exist, at least
if they are influential and of the President‟s own party; if the senators are
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of the president‟s party.38 Appellate judges followed much the same
pattern, though the president has often had a larger role in those
appointments. Recently, however, the executive branch has taken a much
stronger lead in collecting names of potential lower-court nominees, and in
recent decades the Senate has, depending whether the political party of the
president controlled that chamber, to a greater or lesser extent followed the
president‟s plan.39
Another way in which Supreme Court and lower court appointments
have differed over the years is in the appearance of appointees before the
Senate or a Senate committee during the confirmation process. For over
one hundred years following the nation‟s founding, judicial nominees,
even nominees for the Supreme Court, did not appear before the Senate.40
This changed in 1925 with President Coolidge‟s nomination of Harlan

members of the opposition party, then naturally the President turns for
„suggestions‟ to the local chiefs of his own party.
This practice of deferring to home-state Senators with district court nominees is still followed. As
one former chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has stated: “I can tell you right now that when
two Senators from any State fail to return a blue slip for a district court nominee, that is basically the
end of that district court nominee.” 148 CONG. REC. S2209 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
38
Burbank, supra note 10, at 26:
With respect to nominations to the federal trial courts, the Senate‟s role has been
dominated by patronage, backed up by the practice of “senatorial courtesy,” the
so- called “blue slip” system giving a veto power to senators of the president‟s
party from the nominee‟s state, and during some periods to senators from the
other party as well.
39
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202,
1208-09 (1988):

The Senate‟s actual role in the conformation process depended upon the shifting
balance of political power between Congress and the President. The Senate‟s
significant nineteenth-century role reflected the general congressional dominance
of that era. Scarcely one hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson argued that
national government was congressional government—more precisely,
“government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress.” Wilson
put aside the President with the dismissive observation that his “business . . .
occasionally great, is usually not much above routine.” Although some such
model of congressional government could be defended as late as the beginning of
the New Deal, modern government is presidential government, at least in its
most important aspects. Presidential ascendancy in the appointment process
reflects this fact (citations omitted).
40
Judge John J. Parker, nominated to the Court by Herbert Hoover in 1930, asked to testify before
the Senate Judiciary Committee and was refused. So, too, George Williams in 1874 and John Harlan in
1877. Freund, supra note 5, at 1158 n.57, 1161.
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Fiske Stone to the Supreme Court.41 Since the 1939 hearings for Justices
Felix Frankfurter and William O. Douglas, nearly every Supreme Court
nominee has appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee.42 Hearings
for circuit, and now district, court appointees did not come into fashion
until the last few decades.43 Even today, certain nominees receive very
little consideration before the Judiciary Committee,44 though essentially all
judicial nominees have at least nominal hearings.
Of course, judicial appointments do not happen in a vacuum. In
addition to a stark increase in the number of federal court judges, the
number of other officials requiring Senate confirmation has grown
tremendously. Plus, since the New Deal many areas of government have
become increasingly federalized through expanding numbers of laws and
administrative regulations, which increases the number of interactions
between the president and the Senate.45 Once the judicial nominating
process is seen as part of the everyday political process, withholding
approval of nominations becomes another tool for the Senate, and
individual senators, to use in furthering their political goals. For example,
during the 107th Congress, the period under examination in this paper,
Republicans held up appropriations bills in an effort to get Democrats to
move more swiftly on judicial confirmations.46
41

GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 67.
The exception is California Governor Earl Warren, who was not asked to appear during hearings
in 1953 on his nomination to serve as Chief Justice. Freund, supra note 5, at 1162.
43
See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process
Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 6 (2003) (explaining that,
before 1955, even testimony by Supreme Court nominees was rare).
44
See generally Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting
Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 15 (1989).
45
Cf. Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History Of The Politics Of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 13 (1991):
42

The nomination and confirmation process is an iterative dialogue between the
President, the Senate, and often the Court. Political and personal realities play a
significant role in determining the relative strengths of the voices of the
participants in the dialogue. There is nothing historically anachronistic in Senate
rejection of Presidential appointees; indeed, the Senate has sometimes dictated
the nominee . . . .
The [confirmation process] would be improved if both the President and the
Senate were to recognize that they must take each other seriously. When the
President or the Senate has sought to ignore, spite, humiliate, or exploit the other,
acrimony and poor appointments have resulted.
46

See Paul Kane, Bush Pressed On Nominees; GOP Senators Urge Public Push for Judges, ROLL
CALL, Sept. 10, 2001 (“But Senate Republicans say they are ready to do battle for their nominees, with
or without a frontal attack by the White House. [Senator] Craig said the GOP is ready to block more
appropriations bills if [Senators] Daschle and Leahy don‟t live up to their agreement to move more
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B. Senate Rules and Norms for the Confirmation of Lower-Court Judges
Several rules of the Senate, both formal and informal, govern the
process of confirming lower-court judges following their nomination by
the president.47 There are many “vetogates” along the way where a
nomination can be delayed or derailed.48
The formal Senate Rules governing the treatment of judicial
nominations are straightforward and do not inform the present discussion.49
Senate Rule XXXI sets forth the general procedures for the handling of
nominations on the floor, Rule XXV(k) establishes the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Rule XXVI sets out the general
rules of committee procedure. The Judiciary Committee also has its own
set of rules, but they are also very simple and not relevant to the important
issues concerning nominations.50 Far more important than the formal rules
of the Senate or Judiciary Committee are informal norms governing the
nomination process, including “blue slipping,” holds, filibusters, and the
general idea of “senatorial courtesy.”
The first potential vetogates, or potential tools of obstruction, are found
in the Judiciary Committee. Judicial nominations are automatically
referred to the committee under Senate rules.51 Several things can happen
to derail a nomination at this point.52 First, the chairman of the committee

nominees. „We don't want to do that, but that certainly is the right of the minority,‟ Craig said. „I
believe we have the 41 votes to cause certain actions.‟”). But cf. Alan Gura, Choosing Better Judges,
12 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 25-27 (Mar. 14, 2001) (contending that judicial nominations should not be
“horse traded”).
47
The same rules apply to the nominations of Supreme Court justices, but those far rarer
nominations have a much higher profile and thus their own set of “rules” not applicable here. For
example, a Supreme Court nomination would likely never be killed by the Judiciary Committee
chairman or even the Majority Leader. The nomination would be sent to Senate for vote. See infra
note 58 (discussing historic practice with respect to floor votes for Supreme Court nominations).
48
Scholars of the legislative process have developed the term “vetogate” (sometimes “veto gate”)
to describe any point in the legislative process where, due to constitutional requirements or legislative
rules or norms, consent of an individual (e.g., the chairman of a congressional committee) or group
(e.g., a congressional committee or either house of Congress) is needed for legislation to pass. If
consent is denied, the legislation is effectively “vetoed.” See Barry R. Weingast et al., Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5
(1992).
49
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, (2d Sess. 2000), available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Standing_Rules_Senate.htm.
50
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES OF PROCEDURE, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
committee_rules.cfm.
51
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXV(l)(5), supra note 49.
52
See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive
Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1125:
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can delay setting a hearing date, or can refuse to set one at all.53 A
majority of senators on the Judiciary Committee can force the chairman to
schedule a hearing,54 but this type of compulsion is extraordinary in the
Senate.55 Because of the principle of unlimited debate, the Senate acts
much of the time by unanimous consent. Thus, any aggressive behavior by
a senator or group of senators against the chairman is likely to lead to
reciprocal actions to punish those senators in the future.
Eventually, of course, enough pressure may be brought to bear on the
Chairman to schedule a hearing. Hearings for lower-court nominees were
the exception, rather than the rule, until relatively recently.56 Now,
however, every judicial nominee who will eventually be considered by the
Senate as a whole receives a Judiciary Committee hearing first. Following
the hearing, the Committee must vote whether to approve the nominee, and
if not, whether to nevertheless send the nominee without approval to the
full Senate for a confirmation vote. A majority vote of the Judiciary
Committee is required to allow the nomination to leave the Committee. In
an exceptional case, the Committee might allow a lower-court nomination
to go to the full Senate even if the nominee failed to win a majority vote in
the Committee, but generally a failure to win approval from Judiciary
Committee is the final step for a lower-court nominee. This summary
rejection contrasts with the Committee practice concerning nominations of
Supreme Court justices, where the Committee traditionally has always sent
nominations to the full Senate, even with a negative or evenly divided vote

The use of committees to examine the qualifications for nominations also
provides opportunities for recalcitrant Senators to engage in institutional heel
dragging . . . . Committees and committee chairs have discretion about when or
even if to hold hearings. While nominations can be formally discharged from
committee, this procedure occurs very infrequently and usually after the process
has been long delayed.
53
There is no requirement in either the Senate or Judiciary Committee Rules that the Chairman set
or hold a hearing for any judicial nominee.
54
See JUDICIARY COMM. RULE IV, supra note 50:

BRINGING A MATTER TO A VOTE. The Chairman shall entertain a nondebatable motion to bring a matter before the Committee to a vote. If there is
objection to bring the matter to a vote without further debate, a roll call vote of
the Committee shall be taken, and debate shall be terminated if the motion to
bring the matter to a vote without further debate passes with ten votes in the
affirmative, one of which must be cast by the minority.
55
56

See, e.g., Denning, supra note 13, at 34 n.146.
See discussion supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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of the Committee on the merits of the nomination.57 A prominent example
of this practice is Clarence Thomas‟s nomination to the Supreme Court.
Although the Democrat-led Judiciary Committee deadlocked over Thomas
by a seven to seven vote, the Committee nevertheless voted thirteen to one
to send the nomination to the Senate floor,58 where, after long hearings, the
entire Senate narrowly voted to confirm.
In the case of lower-court judges, in contrast, even when a majority of
the Senate is prepared to confirm a nominee, the Judiciary Committee will
generally stand by its negative recommendation and refuse to allow the full
Senate to vote. This happened on occasion during the 107th Congress,
during the seventeen months in which Democrats controlled the Senate
following Senator Jeffords‟s defection from the Republican ranks in May
2001.59 During this period, Committee votes on nominations that were not
sent to the floor were generally party-line votes which recognized the
Democrats‟ single-vote majority. Interestingly, apparently no nominations
were defeated in the Judiciary Committee during the last six years of the
Clinton presidency, when Republicans controlled the Judiciary
Committee.60 Instead, Chairman Orrin Hatch simply did not hold a vote—
and often did not even hold hearings—when a nominee did not have
support in the Committee.61
While the chairman of the Judiciary Committee has broad discretion in
setting hearing dates and votes for nominations, even if he personally
supports a nominee he can be constrained by informal vetogates at the
committee level that can prevent nominations from being sent to the floor.
For example, the candidate‟s Judiciary Committee file must be completed.
57
See 107 CONG. REC. S7286 (daily ed. June 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“No matter what
the vote in committee on a Supreme Court nominee, it is the precedent of the Senate that the individual
nominated is given a vote by the whole Senate.”) (attaching research memorandum from the
Congressional Reference Service); id. (statement of Sen. Daschle):

It has been the traditional practice of the Judiciary Committee to report Supreme
Court nominees to the Senate floor once the committee has completed its
consideration. This has been true even for a number of nominees that were
defeated in the Judiciary Committee. Now, Senators Leahy and Hatch have put
in writing their intention that consideration of Supreme Court nominees will
follow the practices and precedents of the Judiciary Committee and the Senate.
58

Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Nomination; Judiciary Panel Deadlocks, 7-7, On Thomas
Nomination to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 11.
59
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S8280-81 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions)
(discussing the defeat in committee of Priscilla Owen‟s nomination to the Fifth Circuit).
60
See discussion of Sen. Lott‟s and Sen. Hatch‟s claims, infra notes 192-96 and accompanying
text.
61
Id.
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The Committee sends each nominee a detailed questionnaire to answer,
and each nominee must also be screened by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
In addition, from the Eisenhower to the Clinton
administrations, the president has always submitted the names of potential
nominees to the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American
Bar Association for evaluation and recommendation, and the ABA report
has been considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee during the
confirmation process.62 In March 2001, the Bush II administration rejected
this long tradition of ABA advance review of nominees.63 However, since
that time Democratic senators have refused to proceed on nominations
without ABA evaluations, and this has led to additional delays in the
process.64
Another committee-level vetogate is the practice of “blue-slipping.”65
Since at least the 1950s, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee has sent
blue slips of paper to both of the home-state senators of the nominee. For
nominations to the Courts of Appeals, which cover multiple states, the
slips go to senators for the state in which the newly-confirmed judge‟s
chambers would be located. Before scheduling a hearing, the Chairman
waits for the senators to return the two blue slips.66 If a senator chooses to
withhold a blue slip, the nomination is effectively killed. The exact effect
of withholding a blue slip has changed over time, because chairmen have
given more or less weight to views of senators not of the president‟s own
party. The blue-slipping procedure has also been the subject of recent
proposals for change, and the 107th Congress made a significant
modification in the procedure by requiring that slips be made public.67
62
See ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary website, http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/
home.html.
63
Neil Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group‘s Role in Screening Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, March 17, 2001, at A1; Neil Lewis, White House Ends Bar Association‘s Role in Screening
Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2001, at A13; Mark Preston, Specter Seeks A.B.A. Role in
Nominations, ROLL CALL, May 3, 2001 (discussing the reinstatement of “ABA‟s role of vetting District
Court nominees”).
64
See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
65
Two exceptional articles on blue-slipping are Brannon P. Denning, The ―Blue Slip‖: Enforcing
the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001), and Elliot E.
Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE
502 (1979).
66
Interestingly, the blue slips of paper actually have instructions stating that if a slip is not returned
within a week detailing a Senator‟s concerns about a nominee, it will be assumed that the Senator has
no objection to the nominee. Slotnick, supra note 65, at 505. In practice, however, a Chairman will
not schedule hearings without the return of both blue slips.
67
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking
Minority Member, announced the change in a “Dear Colleague” letter to the body of the Senate:
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Similar in effect to the blue-slip process is the more general procedure
by which any senator may request a “hold” on consideration of any matter
scheduled to come before the Senate or a committee. The procedure arose
from situations in which senators foresaw their absence during an
important vote and would ask the majority leader—either directly or, if a
member of the minority caucus, by asking the minority leader—to “hold”
the vote until the senator returned.68 Due to the tradition of unlimited
debate in the Senate, and the concomitant ability to filibuster, such requests
for holds have generally been honored.
Because senatorial holds involve often informal, oral communication
between an individual senator and his caucus leader, little is known about
the early use of this practice. However, it is clear that in recent times this
procedure has frequently been used to derail judicial nominations. Large
numbers of nominees have languished under anonymous holds, with only
the majority or minority leader knowing why the hold had been placed or
how it might be removed.69 There has been pressure on leaders of both
parties to make all anonymous holds public, including those on judicial
nominations.70 Of course, even if anonymous holds are disallowed,
senators might still use public holds to delay consideration of
nominations.71
Holds are particularly interesting because senators sometimes use them
even if the “holding” senator favors a particular nominee. The hold might
DEAR COLLEAGUE: We write as Chairman and Ranking Republican Member
of the Judiciary Committee to inform you of a change in Committee practice
with respect to nominations. The “blue slips” that the Committee has
traditionally sent to home State Senators to ask their views on nominees to be
U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Marshals and federal judges, will be treated as public
information.
We both believe that such openness in the confirmation process will benefit the
Judiciary Committee and the Senate as a whole. Further, it is our intention that
this policy of openness with regard to “blue slips” and the blue slip process
continue in the future, regardless of who is Chairman or which party is in the
majority in the Senate.
Therefore, we write to inform you that the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
with the full support of the former Chairman and Ranking Republican Member,
is exercising his authority to declare that the blue slip process shall no longer be
designated or treated as Committee confidential.
107 CONG. REC. S7285 (daily ed. June 29, 2001).
68
Denning, supra note 65, at 20-1 & n.95.
69
Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I am encouraged
that this confirmation today was not delayed by extended, unexplained, anonymous holds on the Senate
Executive Calendar, the type of hold that characterized so much of the previous 6-1⁄2 years.”).
70
See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S1872-S1881 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (discussing Amendment No.
2944 to the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006).
71
See examples infra note 224.
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be placed in an attempt to get another senator, or even the president, to act
on an entirely different legislative matter. Action on nominations, like
action on any matter pending before a legislative body, is subject to the
constant applications and counter-applications of political pressure that
mark our form of government, particularly in the Senate due to its tradition
of unlimited debate.
Even if a nomination passes to the full Senate, it may not immediately
come up for vote. First, the Majority Leader, on his own initiative or
pursuant to a hold, could refuse to schedule a vote of the full Senate. And,
while the Majority Leader of the Senate has a great deal of power over the
confirmation process once it reaches the Senate floor, a determined
minority can temporarily or even indefinitely delay action on any Senate
decision by filibuster or threat of filibuster.72 Currently, debate on any
matter before the Senate may not be cut off without a cloture vote by sixty
senators,73 and a filibuster threat is generally enough to cause the majority
leader to defer consideration of a matter that needs to come before the full
Senate.74
Where no vote is scheduled by the end of a session of Congress or any
other period for which the Senate recesses for more than thirty days, the
nomination is by rule “returned” to the president, and no further action can
be taken on the nominee unless the president renominates the candidate.75
However, the Senate generally agrees by unanimous consent to suspend
this rule and extend the nominations beyond the major summer and winter
breaks of a given Congress.76
72
For an exhaustive discussion of all aspects of the filibuster, see generally Catherine Fisk &
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997).
73
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXII, supra note 49.
74
Republicans forced cloture votes on filibustered judicial nominees during the 108th Congress, but
Democrats were able to sustain the filibusters. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11463-4 (daily ed. Nov. 18,
2004).
75
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXXI(6), supra note 49:

Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are
made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again
made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a
recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted
upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the
Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall
again be made to the Senate by the President.
See also McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 52, at 1125 (“Under the Senate‟s standing rule 38(6),
nominations that have not been confirmed or rejected expire during any Senate recess exceeding thirty
days. These nominations therefore fail unless the president formally resubmits them.”).
76
An exception to the general retention of nominees over Congressional recesses came in the
summer of 2001. 147 CONG. REC. S8888-91 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001).
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Finally, even after a successful vote of confirmation, in theory any
senator who voted to confirm a judicial nominee might afterwards make a
motion for reconsideration.77 In practice, though, this rule does not usually
have any effect, as such a motion is immediately made and “laid on the
table” following each successful confirmation vote.78
With this brief overview of Senate processes for handling lower-court
judicial nominations, we now turn to the core of this article, evaluating the
rhetoric used by senators when characterizing delay in lower-court
confirmations.
III. LIES, DAMN LIES, AND STATISTICS OF THE 107TH CONGRESS79
President George W. Bush‟s first two years in office, from 2001 to
2002, the period of the 107th Congress, are an interesting time period for
which to examine the political maneuverings that suffuse the debate over
lower-court judicial nominations. First, the 2000 presidential election was
tightly contested. Bush, the Republican candidate, lost the national
popular vote to Democratic candidate Al Gore by some 340,000 votes yet
won in the Electoral College by a vote of 271 to 266.80 The Electoral
77

STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXIII(1), supra note 49.
But see Sheldon Goldman, Reagan‘s Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle At
Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 336 (1987), for a good story of a motion to reconsider being used
strategically by Senator Robert Byrd in 1986 to delay the confirmation of Seventh Circuit nominee
Daniel A. Manion.
79
MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN‟S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924) (“There are three kinds of lies: lies,
damned lies, and statistics” (attributing quotation to Benjamin Disraeli).). See also 148 CONG. REC.
S3527 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Specter):
78

[I]n my Senate tenure we have had three situations where the White House and
the Senate were controlled by different parties. When there is debate about what
has happened [with judicial appointments] and how long the nominations have
taken, although I have been here and followed the situation closely, I get lost in
the statistics. I think the American people do too.
148 CONG. REC. S3548 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Reid):
I have always been very dubious of numbers because even as one who did not
have a degree in engineering or did not do much in the way of math in high
school or college, I can still do a lot of things with numbers. We can manipulate
numbers—you know that is easy to do. We can have all kinds of numbers
games.
148 CONG. REC. S4113 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“I have learned over the
years that when you are talking about judges and judicial nominations each side will have their
statistics about what happened in the Clinton years, what happened in the Reagan years, and what
happens right now.”).
80
Editorial, The Case for the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A34.
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College victory, however, came only after a divided United States Supreme
Court on December 12 ordered the state of Florida to cease a state-courtordered recount, leaving Bush with a 537-vote margin in Florida and
therefore that state‟s twenty-five Electoral College votes.81 With such a
narrowly elected president, and thus less of a presidential mandate, the
chances were greater that Senate preferences would strongly influence the
judicial selection process.82
Second, the even political division of the country illustrated by the
presidential election was also reflected in the composition of the Senate
following the 2000 elections, with Republicans and Democrats divided
fifty to fifty for the first time in the history of the Senate.83 Because the
newly-elected Vice President, Dick Cheney, could break any tie vote in his
role as President of the Senate, the Senate by unanimous consent allowed
Republicans to chair all Senate committees,84 although the membership of
each committee was evenly split between the parties.85 As with the
country‟s close decision on the choice of president, the evenly divided
Senate would likely serve to bring into focus any debates over judicial
nominations.
The 107th Congress is also a fruitful era to study judicial nominations
because the nine justices of the Supreme Court had in 2000 been together
for over six and one-half years, a very long time between Supreme Court
vacancies.86 Many pundits believed that one or more seats on the Court
would need to be filled during Bush‟s term as president, and commentators
predicted that both parties would treat early lower-court nomination battles
as a “warm up” for the Supreme Court confirmation fights that would
follow if a justice retired or passed away.87
81
R.W. Apple, Jr., The 43rd President: News Analysis; Now, Lifting the Clouds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2000, at A1.
82
Neil A. Lewis, Hurdles to Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2001, at A10 (As Senator Leahy
predicted during the 107th Congressional session, “I think the closeness of the election and the ill will
engendered by the Supreme Court is going to make it difficult for the new administration to make some
clear ideological stamp on the courts.”).
83
147 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001); 147 CONG. REC. S29 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001). There
had been a 48-48 division of the Senate in 1953.
84
S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S8 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001).
85
S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001); see also 147 CONG. REC.
S53-S54 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2001).
86
Ultimately, no vacancy occurred until Chief Justice William Rehnquist‟s death in September
2005.
87
148 CONG. REC. S1234 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2002 ) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“[O]ne never
knows—but in looking at the proceedings as to Judge Pickering, this may be a warm-up for the next
Supreme Court nomination.”); cf. Robin Toner, Interest Groups Set for Battle on a Supreme Court
Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at A1 (quoting an activist who characterized the fight over John
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Finally, the balance of the Senate swung back to the Democrats when
Vermont Republican Jim Jeffords renounced his party membership on May
24, 2001, and became the Senate‟s lone independent. With the Senate now
split 50-49-1 in favor of the Democrats, with whom Jeffords agreed to
caucus, committees were reformed with Democratic majorities and
chairpersons. Thus, the 107th Congress provides the rare opportunity to
look at judicial appointments when the president‟s party and the opposition
party each had control of the Senate advise-and-consent apparatus for at
least some period of time.
In telling the story of judicial nominations in the 107th Congress, this
paper focuses on arguments made by senators of both parties that purport
to be based on numerical comparisons between the Senate‟s past and
present timeliness with respect to judicial confirmations. The next section
points out a number of “confirmation process fallacies” repeatedly invoked
by senators in their efforts to score political points from issues that arise
during the confirmation process. The article also identifies “confirmation
process relevancies”88 in hopes that future debates about delay in the
judicial confirmation process can be grounded in meaningful statistics
rather than the trivial and irrelevant.
A. 107th Congress, 1st Session (2001)
The Fall 2000 Congressional elections resulted in a Democratic Party
net gain of four seats in the Senate, leaving that body split evenly between
the Democrats and Republicans. The first session of the 107th Congress
convened on January 3, 2001, with outgoing Vice President Al Gore taking
the chair in his capacity as Senate President.89 Because the new
Republican president and vice president would not be sworn in until
January 20, 2001, Senate committees were chaired by Democrats until
noon on that date, with Republican chairs named to then take over,
reflecting the ability of the Vice President to break any ties on the floor of
the Senate following the new administration‟s inauguration.90
Discussions continued in early January 2001 between Trent Lott and
Tom Daschle—the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate,
respectively—over the exact membership and rules that would govern the
Senate committees following the Republican takeover. On January 5, the
Ashcroft‟s 2001 nomination for Attorney General as “a very conscious practice run”). See generally
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2003).
88
See Twain, supra note 20.
89
147 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001).
90
S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001).
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leaders finally reached an agreement which provided for committees split
evenly between the parties but chaired by Republicans.91 The Judiciary
Committee was to be chaired, as it had been during the final six years of
the Clinton presidency, by Republican Orrin Hatch of Utah.
The initial work of any Judiciary Committee following an election that
produces a new administration is to confirm certain important executivebranch officials, such as the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and
various assistants and deputies within the Justice Department. On January
29, 2001, Bush II sent over his nomination of former Senator John
Ashcroft to be Attorney General. This selection was followed by the
March 13 nomination of Theodore Olson to be Solicitor General, Larry D.
Thompson‟s nomination for Deputy Attorney General on March 22, and
the nominations of a handful of Assistant Attorneys General through the
end of April.
Bush II sent his first judicial nominations to the Senate, for eleven
circuit court positions, on May 9, 2001.92 By June 22nd he had made

91
S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S41-S42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001). In pertinent part, the
agreement specified the following:

Sec. 1. All Senate committees would be “composed equally of members of both
parties” appointed by the respective leaders and would have equal budgets and
office space. Committee Chairs would have the right to place on the full
committee‟s agenda “any Legislative or Executive Calendar item which has not
been reported because of a tie vote” in a subcommittee.
Sec. 2. If the composition of the Senate changed so that one party gained a
majority, “then each committee ratio shall be adjusted to reflect the ratio of the
parties in the Senate, and the provisions of this resolution shall have no further
effect, except that the members appointed by the two Leaders, pursuant to this
resolution, shall no longer be members of the committees, and the committee
chairmanships shall be held by the party which has attained a majority of the
whole number of Senators.”
Sec. 3. If a committee did not report out an item or nomination because of a tie
vote, then either of the leaders could make a motion to discharge, which would
be voted on under limited debate rules. If the discharge motion succeeded, the
original item or nomination would be placed immediately on the appropriate
Senate calendar. Cloture motions (to cut off unlimited debate) were prohibited
“on an amendable item during its first 12 hours of Senate debate.” Also, both
leaders would “seek to attain an equal balance of the interests of the two parties
when scheduling and debating . . . .”
92

Note that references made throughout the remainder of the article are to nominations to the
United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeal, including the Federal Circuit.
Not included are nominations to the Territorial Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of
International Trade, the Tax Court, or the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Any unsourced
numerical claims or statistics are derived from an appointments dataset kept by the author, based on
materials from an electronic database kept by the United States Senate Library, cross-checked and
supplemented with data from the Congressional Record and from a dataset maintained by the Federal
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another fifteen nominations, eight of which were for appellate judgeships.
Compared to the past, this was a torrid pace for the nomination of federal
judges, and in particular judges of the Courts of Appeals. For example,
President Reagan nominated his first judges on July 1, 1981, and did not
reach eleven circuit court nominations until a year after he entered office,
by which time he had also made thirty-six district court nominations. Bush
I sent his first new lower-court nominees to the Senate on August 4,
1989,93 and did not reach eleven circuit court nominees until fifteen
months after taking office, by which time he had made a total of forty
nominations. President Clinton sent his first judicial nomination to the
Senate in August 1993, and his eleventh circuit court nomination the
following March. Clinton had nominated a total of sixty-nine lower-court
judges by that date. In contrast, by approximately the same point in his
presidency, March 21, 2002, Bush II had nominated ninety-seven judges,
and twenty-nine had been to the Courts of Appeals.
Following Bush II‟s early nominations, the Republican-led Judiciary
Committee noticed its first hearing for judicial nominees for May 23, 2001,
the day before Senator Jeffords left the Republican Party and became an
independent.94 However, the hearing was postponed by request of
Committee Democrats,95 and it was not immediately rescheduled following
the change to Democratic control of the Senate. After Jeffords‟s switch,
much committee business in the Senate came to a halt while party leaders
worked on a new organizing resolution.96 This process took some time.97
Judicial Center, entitled HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY. See website of the Federal Judicial
Center, http://www.fjc.gov.
93
On February 28, 1990, Bush I renominated four Reagan nominees who had not been confirmed
at the end of the prior congress. While technically nominees of Bush I, their early nominations reflect
the fact that they had already been selected by the previous administration, and therefore the August 4
nominees more accurately represent the “first” Bush I nominees. If the February 28, 1989, nominees
are counted, the eleventh Bush I nominee to the Court of Appeals was made on February 20, 1990,
when a total of thirty-five lower-court judges had been nominated.
94
147 CONG. REC. D502 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (hearings on the nominations of Deborah L.
Cook and Jeffrey S. Sutton, each to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, and the
nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
95
Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
96
Some committees were able to meet and confirm executive branch nominees, but the Judiciary
Committee did not meet for the purposes of judicial hearings. Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S2937, S2937
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
97
See Paul Kane, Lott‘s Push for Judges Imperils Partisan Truce, ROLL CALL, Oct. 4, 2001
(“Leahy has taken an almost personal offense to Republicans who have questioned his pace in
confirming judges. He wasn‟t able to hold any judicial nomination hearings until early July, after the
GOP had put up a four-week fight over the reorganization of committees when Democrats claimed the
majority in early June.”).
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Under the terms of the original organizing resolutions of the 107th Senate,98
if one party gained the majority at any time during either the 2001 or 2002
congressional session, committee chairmanships went to that party and all
committees reverted to their previous memberships from the 106th
Congress.99 Because the Republicans had majorities on all committees
during the 106th Congress, immediately after the Jeffords switch the Senate
had Democratic chairs of committees with Republican majorities. And
because the organization of the Senate is established by unanimous
consent, the Republicans had the ability to hold up any further
reorganization in order to get some concessions.100
Republican senators demanded concessions over judicial confirmations
because they were concerned that the newly-Democratic-controlled
Judiciary Committee would use its power to hold up appointments.101
98
S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001); S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147
CONG. REC. S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001).
99
S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001) (In the event of one party
gaining a majority, “the [committee] members appointed by the two Leaders, pursuant to this
resolution, shall no longer be members of the committees, and the committee chairmanships shall be
held by the party which has attained a majority of the whole number of Senators.”).
100
See Dave Boyer, Senate GOP to Make Push to Help Bush‘s Judge Picks; Hopes to Gain
Leverage From Brief Committee Majority, WASH. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2001, at A1:

Republicans want a guarantee that Mr. Bush‟s current and future nominees will
be brought up for floor votes. And they believe an unusual feature of the
midterm power shift gives the GOP added leverage: Until both parties agree to a
reorganization, Democrats will chair committees with Republican majorities . . . .
And 11 freshman senators who received their committee assignments this year,
including Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, would be left without
any such posts for the time being.
“It‟s completely wild,” said a former Senate Republican leadership aide.
“They‟re not going to get this resolved this week. If you think that at noon
Wednesday Hillary will have a committee assignment, you‟re under an illusion.”
See also 147 CONG. REC. 7993 (daily ed. July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I sent out
official notice of the Committee‟s first hearing on judicial nominations within 10 minutes after
Majority Leader Daschle announced that an agreement had been reached on reorganization. The
hearing was held the day after Committee membership assignments were completed earlier this
month.”). But see 147 CONG. REC. 7994 (daily ed. July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing
that Sen. Leahy should have held nominations hearings during the reorganization period, when they
would have had Republican majorities: “[I]t appears that the decision not to hold hearings on nominees
was simply a calculated tactic to delay President Bush‟s nominees.”).
101
See Noelle Straub, Senate Agrees to Floor Vote on Impasse, THE HILL, June 20, 2001. See also
Paul Kane, Chairman Says Fight Over Reorganization is Delaying Progress, ROLL CALL, June 25,
2001:
Democrats are hoping to pin the blame on Senate Republicans who are holding
out for a better deal on the committee resolution in their negotiations with
Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.). “We could have had four or five or
six [judicial nomination] hearings already if we hadn‟t had this,” Leahy said of
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While there were no formal rule changes in response to the Republican
concerns, incoming Democratic Judiciary Committee chair Senator Patrick
Leahy did assuage some fears by placing a “Dear Colleague” letter in the
Congressional Record. In the letter, also signed by Senator Orrin Hatch,
the ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator
Leahy agreed that the “blue slip” process would no longer be confidential,
and also that any Supreme Court nominees would be sent from the
Committee to the floor of the Senate for consideration, even if they were
opposed by a majority of the Judiciary Committee.102 With these two
important agreements in place, the Senate on June 29, 2001, was able to
pass by unanimous consent a resolution providing for the reorganization of
Senate committees with Democratic majorities.103
The Judiciary Committee met under Democratic control for the first
time on July 11, 2001.104 Almost immediately, Republicans began
complaining about the slow pace of judicial confirmations. On July 16,
Senator Kyl of Arizona, though claiming that he did not “want to point any
fingers in the spirit of bipartisanship which I am invoking here today,”
noted that no lower-court judges had yet been confirmed even though the
Senate was “past the midway point of this year.”105 Two days later,
Senator Sessions of Alabama complained that only three judges had come
out of the Judiciary Committee in seven months.106 Around this time,
Republicans also directed criticism at the Judiciary Committee‟s failure to
move forward on executive-branch nominations, as well.107
the negotiations. He added in reference to Bush: “His own party is blocking him
from [us] holding nomination hearings.” Republicans, however, contend that
Democratic statements regarding GOP nominations since retaking the majority
have left them with no other strategy than to risk a short-term logjam for the
long-term benefit of securing the safest route for Bush's judges.
147 CONG. REC. S7285 (daily ed. June 29, 2001) (reproducing the full text of Leahy‟s letter).
Sen. R. 120, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S7285-86 (daily ed. June 29, 2001).
147 CONG. REC. D 684 (daily ed. July 11, 2001) (The hearing was for Roger L. Gregory,
nominated to be United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, and Richard F. Cebull and Sam E.
Haddon, each nominated to be a United States District Judge for the District of Montana. These were
not controversial nominees: Gregory was originally a Clinton nominee and had been renominated by
Bush II in a gesture of bipartisanship, and Cebull and Haddon had enthusiastic bipartisan support from
their home-state senators, Burns (Rep.) and Baucus (Dem.).) See 147 CONG. REC. S7994 (daily ed.
July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
105
147 CONG. REC. S7664 (daily ed. July 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
106
147 CONG. REC. S7890 (daily ed. July 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
107
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S8037 (daily ed. July 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. Craig referring to
the June 5, 2001, nomination of John Walters to be the Nation‟s drug czar) (“The Judiciary Committee
does not appear to be functioning well. We have had changes in chairmanships, but the new chairman
has had plenty of time. Just send out a notice, bring down the gavel, listen to this man and question this
man about what he will do . . . .”).
102
103
104
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Although true as far as they went, the Kyl and Sessions criticisms in
July 2001 were misleading. As discussed above, in the previous three
administrations no judicial nominations had even been sent to the Senate
until July or August, sixth months after each president took office. The
first Judiciary Committee hearing during Reagan‟s first term was on July
14,108 the first Judiciary Committee hearing for Bush I was not until
September 26,109 and Clinton‟s first hearing for judicial nominees in 1993
was not until September 23.110 Especially given Jeffords‟s defection from
the Republican Party and the more than month-long reorganization of the
Senate during June and July, it was unremarkable that little in the way of
judicial confirmation activity had taken place in mid-July 2001 at either the
committee or full Senate level.111 Thus we have the first of our
paradigmatic false arguments (“fallacies”) about delay in the judicial
confirmation process:
1. Fallacy #1 (―Dog Days‖)
Failing to take into consideration that the main business of lower-court
judicial confirmations during the first year of a new presidency does not
take place until late fall.
Senator Kyl stepped up the pressure on the Democratic-led Judiciary
Committee the following week. On July 23, 2001, he noted that there were
108 vacancies in the federal courts, which was “about 45 or so more than
there were at the end of the Clinton administration.”112 Kyl also quoted
Democratic senators who had complained of delay during the Clinton
administration, when Republicans controlled the Judiciary Committee. For
example, Kyl noted that Senator Daschle had claimed in March 2000 that a
“failure to fill [open judicial] vacancies is straining our Federal court
system and delaying justice for people all across this country.” According
108
Confirmation of Federal Judges (Part 1): Hearings on the Selection and Confirmation of
Federal Judges Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1 (1981).
109
Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments (Part 1): Hearings on Appointments to the
Federal Judiciary Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1989).
110
Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments (Part 1): Hearings on Confirmations of
Appointments to the Federal Judiciary Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1 (1993).
111
Senator Hatch argued that the Judiciary Committee could have met under Democratic control
prior to the agreement of June 29, 1989. See 147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Hatch). Given the highly contentious nature of judicial confirmation hearings, and
especially those anticipated over several high-profile conservative nominees sent to the Senate by
President Bush in May 2001, it is highly unlikely the Democrats would have been content to chair a
Judiciary Committee with a majority-Republican membership.
112
147 CONG. REC. S8034 (daily ed. July 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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to Kyl, “When [Daschle] made that statement, there were 76 vacancies, 29
of which were categorized as „judicial emergencies.‟ Today there are 108
vacancies, 40 of which are classified as „judicial emergencies.‟”113
Senator Daschle was actually incorrect when he claimed only seventysix vacancies—there were eighty-five unfilled judicial positions in the
lower federal courts at the time he made his statement—but the more
important point is that Senator Kyl‟s comparisons were not particularly
revealing because they compared vacancies during different time periods
of the two administrations. March 2000, when Daschle commented on
vacancies, was the beginning of the last year of Clinton‟s two-term
presidency, whereas July 2001, when Kyl criticized the vacancies left over
from Clinton‟s era, came at the very start of confirmations for Bush II‟s
judges. A more apt comparison for judicial vacancy numbers in July
2001—Bush II‟s first year—would have been to July of Clinton‟s first
year. For example, during the entire month of July 1993 there were 117
vacancies on the lower federal courts, a number which grew to 125 before
the first four Clinton judges were confirmed on September 30, 2003.114
Moreover, the 117 vacancies in July 1993 represented 14.4% of the 811
positions in the federal judiciary, whereas the 108 vacancies in July 2001
represented only 13% of the then-existing 830 judicial positions.115 Kyl‟s
inapt comparison in July 2001 is an example of our second confirmationdelay fallacy:
2. Fallacy #2 (―Time Out‖)
Comparing the number of judicial vacancies during a given time period
in one administration to the number of vacancies in another administration
during a non-analogous time period.
Kyl‟s claim of “45 or so more” vacancies in July 2001 than at the end of
the Clinton administration was also simply wrong. In fact, there were
seventy-three vacancies on Election Day 2000, and eighty-one vacancies
by the official end of the Clinton presidency, January 20, 2001—a
113
Id. at S8034-35. Daschle‟s original statement is found at 146 CONG. REC. S1255 (daily ed. Mar.
8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
114
Democrats controlled the Senate during Clinton‟s first two years, so partisanship cannot be
much blamed for any slowness in pace. The larger point is that institutional issues inevitably lead to a
growth in vacancies in the period immediately following a presidential election.
115
The judiciary was expanded from 811 with the addition of nine positions on January 1, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1999)), and another 10
positions on January 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
133 (2000)).
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difference of twenty-seven vacancies from the 108 open judicial seats in
July 2001.
Some of the large number of vacancies at the beginning of the Clinton
and Bush II administrations probably reflects the fact that many lifetenured judges retire or take senior status after the White House switches
parties due to a presidential election.116 For example, following twelve
years of Republican presidency from 1981 to 1992, thirty-three judges left
office in the one-year period beginning in October 1992. Nineteen of those
judges had been appointed by Democratic presidents. Similarly, following
eight years of the Clinton administration, forty-five judges left office in the
year beginning in October 2000, of whom thirty-four had been appointed
by Republicans. Even if there is no political reason for the timing of these
judicial retirements, the important point here is that due to institutional
behavior in the Senate and the executive branch, many judicial vacancies
will necessarily arise between the time that the Senate stops considering
judicial nominees—no later than the summer of an election year—and the
time when the Judiciary Committee begins its work on the judicial
nominees of a new administration, generally no earlier than late summer or
fall of the next year.
This observation gives us the first of our
paradigmatic truisms (“relevancies”) about delay in the judicial
confirmation process:
3. Relevancy #1 (―Retirement Plan‖)
Large numbers of vacancies arise during the time period between the
summer of a presidential election year and the fall of the first year of a
new administration, particularly when the parties of the incoming and
outgoing presidents differ.
In the weeks following Senator Kyl‟s and Senator Sessions‟s critical
statements about the supposed slow pace of confirmation hearings under
the Democratic Senate, the new chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
116
See Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal
Courts, 1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 464-72 (1990); David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial
Retirement Strategies: The Judge‘s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM.
POL. Q, 458, 484-85 (2000) (“To the extent that politics matters, it is primarily in the efforts of judges
to delay retirement in the waning months of an opposing party president‟s administration, hoping for a
change in White House control.”); James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic
Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573 (1995). Then again, a
recent provocative article suggests that retirement rates are more closely related to pension vesting than
to any political considerations. Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical
Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006).
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Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont, began to answer his critics.117
Unfortunately, Leahy‟s claims about delay were also off the mark. After
detailing the delays caused by the changeover in Senate control in June,
Leahy continued:
Now consider the progress we have made on judicial
nominations in [the context of those delays]. There were
no hearings on judicial nominations and no judges
confirmed in the first half of the year [2001] with a
Republican majority. The first hearing I chaired on July
11 was one more than all the hearings that had been held
involving judges in the first half of the year. The first
judicial nomination who the Senate confirmed last Friday
was more than all the judges confirmed in the first half of
the year.118
But this claim of superior pace in the judicial confirmation process was
as out-of-context as the Kyl and Sessions comments of only a few days
before and was, indeed, just a version of the Dog Days fallacy, which
reflects the fact that little happens in the process until the first September
of a new presidency. As explained above, the failure of the Republican-led
Judiciary Committee to hold hearings during the first half of 2001 was
dictated not by any unusual procrastination by Republican Committee
Chairman Hatch, but rather by the regular timing cycle of judicial
nominations that follow a presidential election in which the White House
changes hands.
Leahy also compared the number of appellate judges confirmed during
the first year of the Bush I administration (five) and the number confirmed
during the first year of Clinton‟s presidency (three) with the single
appellate judge that the current Senate had just confirmed, and observed
that his committee had already held hearings for two additional Court of
Appeals nominees.119 However, Leahy failed to note that the confirmed
judge was Roger Gregory, originally a Clinton nominee and recess
117
The tenor of the July 2001 debate over judicial appointments is well-illustrated by the following
excerpt from Senator Leahy: “In spite of the progress we have been making during the few weeks
since the Senate was allowed to reorganize . . . on Monday our Republican colleagues took to the
Senate floor to change the tone of Senate debate on nominations into a bitterly partisan one. That was
most unfortunate.” 147 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. July 27, 2001).
118
147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). See also 147
CONG. REC. S10681 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Reid) (to same effect).
119
147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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appointment to the Fourth Circuit, who was only renominated by Bush II
as a gesture of bipartisan cooperation at the time of an evenly-divided
Senate.120
Leahy also claimed that his Judiciary Committee‟s performance thus far
in 2001 compared favorably to the appellate confirmations of 1996, when,
according to Leahy, a Republican-led Senate failed to confirm even one of
Clinton‟s Court of Appeals nominees.121 While the Senate‟s record of
obstruction in 1996 was indeed extraordinary, as discussed further below,
that year is not a good benchmark for comparisons with the first half of
2001. Leahy‟s argument is a more particularized version of the Time Out
fallacy, in which one compares the number of judicial vacancies during a
given period of time in one administration to the number of vacancies in
another administration during a non-analogous time period. The years in
which presidential elections take place, such as 1988, 1992, 1996, and
2000, have at least in recent history been markedly slower than other years
for judicial confirmations.122 The obvious reason for this relative inaction
is that Senators in opposition to the sitting president wish to hold judicial
seats open on the chance that a president of their party will be able to fill
them in a new administration.123 Thus the second confirmation-delay
relevancy:
4. Relevancy #2 (―Four Corners‖)
Within a president‘s four-year term, the year leading up to the next
presidential election (the fourth year) is markedly slower than other years
for judicial confirmations.
As discussed above, the first year following a presidential election
typically has different institutional problems that lead to delay in
confirmations, but such years are not easily comparable to years in which a
presidential election takes place.

120

See supra note 104.
147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Leahy was wrong
about this. A. Wallace Tashima and Sidney R. Thomas were both confirmed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 2, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S19344 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1996).
122
See Goldman, Unpicking, supra note 15, at 710 (“It is true that Congresses that include a
presidential election year . . . have a lower proportion of confirmations than Congresses that do not.”).
123
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S7452 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (quoting
Prof. Kent Markus during the confirmations in 1996) (“The fact was, a decision had been made to hold
the vacancies and see who won the presidential election. With a Bush win, all those seats could go to
Bush rather than Clinton nominees.”).
121
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Leahy was on firmer ground in discussing Bush II‟s nominations to
positions designated as “judicial emergencies” by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts.124 Leahy was correct in his claim that the
president had not yet nominated a single judge to fill one of the twentythree judicial emergency positions in the District Courts.125 By July 27,
2001, Bush II had nominated twenty-nine judges, but twenty had been to
the Courts of Appeals, and none of the nine District Court nominees were
for emergency positions.126 While twelve of the twenty appellate
nominations were for judicial emergencies, Leahy was right in noting that
“many of these emergency vacancies became emergency vacancies and
were perpetuated as emergency vacancies by the Republican majority‟s
refusal to act on President Clinton‟s nomination[s] over the last 6 years.”127
Indeed, fifteen of the eighteen Court of Appeals judicial emergency
positions in July 2001 had lingered unfilled from at least one year and in
some cases up to eight years during the Clinton administration.128 This is
of course a product of the Four Corners relevancy.
The following week, on August 2, 2001, Chairman Leahy and the
Ranking Minority member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin
Hatch, exchanged barbs regarding the number of hearings held and the
number of judges confirmed during the month of July 2001, as compared
124
For the Judicial Conference definition of “judicial emergency” positions, see Revised Definition
for Judicial Emergencies, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/080801/emergencies.htm.
125
147 CONG. REC. S8340 (July 27, 2001). There were actually twenty-two District Court judicial
emergencies. See http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/070201/emergencies2.htm (data for July 2, 2001).
126
The eighteen judicial emergencies for the Courts of Appeals were for the Second, Third, Fourth
(four), Fifth (three), Sixth (four), Eighth, Ninth (three), and Eleventh Circuits. See id. These figures
did not reflect that Judge Gregory had been confirmed to the 4th Circuit on July 20, 2001. 147 CONG.
REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001)(statement of Sen. Leahy).
127
Id. at S8340-41.
128
See also 147 CONG. REC. S8341 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I remind
my colleagues of their failure to grant a hearing or Committee or Senate consideration to the following:
Robert Cindrich to the Third Circuit; Judge James A. Beaty, Jr. and Judge James A. Wynn, Jr. to the
Fourth Circuit; Jorge Rangel, Enrique Moreno and H. Alston Johnson to the Fifth Circuit; Judge
Helene White, Kathleen McCree-Lewis and Kent Marcus to the Sixth Circuit; Bonnie Campbell to the
Eighth Circuit; James Duffy and Barry Goode to the Ninth Circuit. Those were 12 Court [sic] of
Appeals nominees to 10 vacancies who could have gone a long way toward reducing the level of
judicial emergencies around the country.”). On several occasions, Senator Leahy remarked on the
irony of the Republican rush to fill judicial positions that had been held over from the Clinton
presidency. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10684 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy):

It is a little bit like the young person who is before the court. He is there for
murdering his parents and he says, Your Honor, you have to have mercy on me.
I am an orphan. Well, this is the same thing. Republicans spent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
years creating enormous judicial vacancies and then they come in and say we
have to fill these judicial vacancies.
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to the months of July during each of the previous six years.129 These types
of comparisons make no sense at all. During the first year of a new
presidential administration very little, if anything, happens with regard to
judicial nominations by the end of July.130 There is really no basis for
comparing committee action during the first year of a new presidency to
activity during other years, when more nominations have been made and
time has passed to allow committee investigation and action.
Senator Hatch‟s August 2 claims also illustrate the futility of comparing
activity from the first year of a presidency to years other than the first year
in that or any other presidency. Employing this Time Out fallacy, Hatch
argued that the number of judges confirmed by the Democratic-majority
Senate in July 2001—four—did not match up favorably to the numbers
confirmed in July months between 1995 and 2000, when Republicans
controlled the Senate—eleven, sixteen, three, six, four, and five,
respectively.131 The problem with Hatch‟s argument is that these numbers
ignore the length of time that the Judiciary Committee would have had to
consider nominees by July of a given year. For example, because the
White House changed hands in 2001, no nominations were made that year
until early May, giving the Senate little time to consider them by July. In
contrast, when the Senate confirmed sixteen judges in July 1996, all but
one of those judges had been nominated by May of that year. In fact, nine
of the sixteen had been nominated the year before. Likewise, the three
judges confirmed in July 1997 had all been pending as nominees for over a
year. And only one of the six judges confirmed in July 1998 had been
nominated as late as May of that year.132
Senator Leahy‟s comparison between the two Judiciary Committee
nomination hearings of July 2001 with the number of nomination hearings
held each month during Republican control of the Senate, from 1995 to
2000, also suffers from the Time Out fallacy, in that it compares statistics
from non-analogous time periods of separate administrations.133 The dates

129

See 147 CONG. REC. S8691-92 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statements of Sens. Leahy and Hatch).
See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
131
147 CONG. REC. S8692 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch). These numbers are
mostly correct. Although no judges were confirmed in July 1995, nine judges were confirmed on June
30 of that year.
132
Federal Judicial Center, supra note 92.
133
Senator Leahy argued that:
130

During the more than 6 years in which the Senate Republican majority scheduled
confirmation hearings, there were 34 months with no hearing at all, 30 months
with only one hearing and only 12 times in almost six and one-half years did the
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of Judiciary Committee hearings depend on myriad factors that affect the
scheduling of all Senate floor and committee actions; the timing of the
hearings does not depend on whether it is July.134 Moreover, the timing
and number of hearings do not speak to the ultimate question of the
number of judges confirmed by the full Senate. Thus a particular version
of the Time Out fallacy, often invoked by Senator Leahy:
5. Fallacy #3 (―Hearing Test‖)
Making arguments based solely on the number of Judiciary Committee
hearings held, or hearings held during any particular time period, or the
number of nominees appearing at each hearing.
Because of the Senate‟s August recess and the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, arguments over the pace of judicial confirmations
subsided for a time.135 They resumed in October 2001, however, as
Republicans moved to bring the pace of judicial nominations back into
national focus. Republican senators did so by working to block or slow
down the appropriations process in order to get agreements with the
Democratic majority on the proper pace of judicial confirmation
hearings.136 Senator Leahy took to the floor to answer the challenges.
Leahy‟s main argument was that the pace of judicial confirmations in the
107th Congress compared favorably to the pace of confirmations during the
Judiciary Committee hold as many as two hearings involving judicial
nominations in a month.
147 CONG. REC. S8691-92 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
134
Cf. 147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I disagree
with the whole idea that such a statistic [the number of months of his chairmanship of the Judiciary
Committee during the Clinton administration with no hearings] could be relevant to any analysis of
whether the Senate is performing its constitutional advice and consent function sufficiently.”); see also
Stephan B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 27 (“An apparently
unprecedented number of nominees never made it to a Judiciary Committee hearing and/or to the floor
during the Clinton presidency, however, with the result that statistics based on those who were the
subject of such hearings, or of a vote in the full Senate, are misleading if not meaningless.”).
135
See Paul Kane, Key Agency Nominees Will Receive Rapid Senate Action; Agreement Does Not
Include Judicial Candidates, ROLL CALL, September 17, 2001 (“Republican Policy Committee
Chairman Larry Craig (R-Idaho) agreed that the goodwill on agency nominations is „different‟ from
lifetime positions on the federal bench, but predicted that judicial fights will not reach anywhere near
the level of partisanship that had been building over the past few months.”).
136
See Paul Kane, Lott‘s Push for Judges Imperils Partisan Truce, ROLL CALL, October 4, 2001
(“Revisiting a pre-September 11 strategy, Senate Republicans plan to block and delay the
appropriations process until they get solid guarantees that the Democratic majority will begin to
confirm more judicial nominees . . . . The move appears to have at least the tacit blessing of the White
House.”); Donald Lambro, “GOP ‗Hardball‘ Ploy Aims to Fill Benches; Action Demanded on Bush
Nominees,” WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at A10.
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first years of the Bush I and Clinton presidencies. Leahy noted that during
the first year of the Bush I administration, 1989, “the fourth Court of
Appeals nominee [of five total] was not confirmed until November 8,” and
that “the Senate never confirmed a fourth Court of Appeals nominee”
during Clinton‟s first year, 1993.137 In contrast, in 2001 the Senate was
confirming its fourth appellate nominee on October 4, and would confirm a
fifth by the year‟s end.138
These assertions were correct but did not tell the full story. What most
concerned Republicans was not the absolute number of appellate judges
confirmed, but rather the number of appellate judges nominated but not yet
confirmed. True, by mid-October 2001 four Court of Appeals judges had
been confirmed, but another twenty-one of Bush II‟s appellate nominees
had not.139 In contrast, only one of Clinton‟s appellate nominees had not
been confirmed by mid-October 1993, and all five of Bush I‟s nominees
that had been named by mid-October 1989 were confirmed that year.140
In responding to Senator Leahy‟s remarks, on October 11, 1989 Senator
Hatch made this point about the number of judges that had been nominated
by Bush II but not yet confirmed. He argued that “[m]ost of the statistics
show that the judges who were nominated in the first year of a President,
up to August 1st, basically went through.”141 Minority Leader Trent Lott
referred explicitly to the Bush II appellate court nominees:
But here is what really does concern me. Of the judges
whose names were submitted as far back as May and June,
of that group of circuit judges, which included 19 of them,
and including Judge Gregory, who clearly is a Democratic
nominee, only 3 have been confirmed. One more has been
reported. And there has been 1 hearing, leaving 14 of the
19 circuit judges‟ names submitted in May or early June.142
137

147 CONG. REC. S10539 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001).
Id.
139
Recall that Bush II nominated far more Court of Appeals judges, and far more quickly, than had
previous administrations. See 147 CONG. REC. S10543 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (“There are currently twenty-one of President Bush‟s circuit court nominees pending in
committee and who will be left at the end of his first year if the committee does not act soon.”). See
supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
140
Three other appellate judges were named by Bush I following mid-October 1989, and all were
confirmed by early March 1990.
141
147 CONG. REC. S10541 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001).
142
Id. at S10542. Following up on earlier comments, Senator Hatch elaborated:
138

President Clinton nominated 32 judges before October 31, 1993, his first year in
office. Twenty-eight were confirmed that year. That‟s an 88 percent
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This was really the rub with respect to judicial nominations during Bush
II‟s first year—how should the Senate have reacted to such an
unprecedented flood of nominations, in particular the flood of Court of
Appeals nominations?143 This issue is important because the nominations
process, at least in this respect, may have been permanently changed from
the slower nominations pace of presidents before Bush II. If future
presidents send early nominations to the Senate we will likely again see
that the current system, particularly if the Senate insists on ABA review of
the nominations before consideration in the Judiciary Committee,144 does
not work particularly well to provide speedy confirmations.
6. Relevancy #3 (―Future Shock‖)
If a large number of lower-court judicial nominations are made early in
the first term of future administrations, we should not expect to see speedy
confirmations without changes in the current system of Senate review.
Other arguments made during the fall of 2001 about the statistics of
judicial confirmation rates were flawed. Senator Hatch persisted in
comparing the then-current vacancy rate in the federal judiciary, 108 of
830 (13.0%), with vacancy rates at the end of the 104th, 105th, and 106th
Congresses, which were 7.7%, 5.9%, and 7.9%, respectively.145 This is an
example of the Time Out fallacy—comparing statistics from nonconfirmation rate. It‟s similar to the confirmation rate during the first year of
President G.H.W. Bush‟s presidency— 89 percent—and compares to President
Reagan‟s 100 percent rate of confirmation for nominees sent to the Senate before
October 31, 1981. Compare these rates to where we are under President Bush
and Chairman Leahy. President Bush has nominated 59 judicial nominees. Only
eight have been confirmed—including the two the Senate confirmed tonight.
That‟s a rate of 13.5 percent.
Id. at S10544. Of course, the Democrats still had some time left in 2001. The Senate ended up
confirming twenty-eight lower-court judges by the end of the year.
143
On the great number of early Bush II nominations, see 147 CONG. REC. S10682 (daily ed. Oct.
15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It is important to point out that, probably more than any of the last
four Presidents, [Bush II] has acted with alacrity to fill vacancies.”). See also 148 CONG. REC. S1697
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Smith):
It is unfair to compare the first years of the second Bush administration and the
Clinton administration by looking only at the mere number of nominees
confirmed. This approach fails to take into account the fact that President Bush
chose to nominate 24 more circuit court nominees than President Clinton did.
We can get lost in the numbers, and I don‟t want to go through it.
144
145

See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
See also 147 CONG. REC. S10679 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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analogous time periods of separate administrations. More apt might have
been a comparison to mid-October vacancies during the Reagan, Bush I,
and Clinton presidencies: 115 of 642 (17.9%), 57 of 731 (7.8%), and 122
of 811 (11.7%), respectively. Another favorite Hatch argument was
comparing the total number of judges confirmed under Presidents Reagan
and Clinton:
The bottom line of the [Hatch] Chairmanship is that the
Senate confirmed essentially the same number of judges
for President Clinton as it did for President Reagan—only
5 fewer. This proves the Republicans were fair—
especially because it was a six-year Republican controlled
Senate that confirmed 382 Reagan nominees, and a sixyear Republican controlled Senate that confirmed 377
Clinton nominees.146
When other facts are considered, Hatch‟s simple numerical comparison
does not prove that the Republican Senate was fair to Clinton. For
example, other commentators have ably shown ways in which levels of
obstruction have grown over the last twenty-five years, including during
Senator Hatch‟s time as Chair of the Judiciary Committee.147 Moreover,
when Reagan began his presidency in 1981, there were 642 lower-court
judicial positions in total, a number that rose to 731 at the end of his
second term, for an average of 695 positions during his time in office.148
For Clinton, the number went from 811 to 830, an average of 815
positions. Thus, Reagan‟s 382 confirmations represented 55.0% of the
judiciary, as compared to 46.3% for Clinton. Filling a comparable
percentage of positions would have given Clinton 448 nominations.

146

147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001).
A particularly excellent analysis of the increasing level of obstruction is presented by Professor
Sheldon Goldman in Unpicking, supra note 15, and Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation
Process: The Index of Obstruction and Delay, supra note 15. Also note that 123 of 377 of the judges
confirmed during the Clinton administration—nearly two thirds— were confirmed during the first two
years, when Democrats controlled the Senate.
148
From the start of Reagan‟s first term, there were 642 lower-court judicial positions until April
1982, when the twelve Federal Circuit judges were added. Act of April 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 25. That
number remained constant until July 1984, when the total number of positions rose to 731. Act of July
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 333. President Clinton‟s presidency began with 811 judicial positions. Judicial
appropriation acts added nine district court judges for 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1999)), and another ten positions for 2000, Pub. L. No. 106553, 114 Stat. 2762 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2000)).
147
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7. Fallacy #4 (―Absolute Value‖)
Asserting that the total number of judges confirmed during a presidency
is a true measure of Judiciary Committee fairness and effectiveness.
As the Republicans continued to stall appropriations bills through midOctober 2001 in order to force Democrats to move faster on judicial
nominations, many senators from both sides of the aisle made speeches on
the judicial confirmation process. The senators‟ arguments generally
echoed those made by Senators Leahy and Hatch, the current and former
chair of the Judiciary Committee and thus the two leaders most closely
associated with nominations.
A few new statistics were tossed into the mix. A common Republican
claim, made in one instance by Senator George Allen of Virginia on
October 16, 2001, was that only eight Bush II judges had been confirmed
thus far—“nowhere near the 28 judges confirmed during Clinton‟s first
year, nor the 16 confirmed during Bush I‟s first year.”149 As with some of
the other arguments discussed above, this argument fails to take into
account the cycles of a given year‟s confirmations, evidencing the Dog
Days and Time Out fallacies. Of the twenty-seven first-year Clinton
appointees, only four were approved prior to October 20, 1993. The four
Bush I judges confirmed before October 25, 1989, were all renominations
of Reagan appointees that had not gone through. All eleven of Bush I‟s
new nominees were confirmed between late October and the end of the
year. President Reagan had an unusually high number of judges—
twelve—confirmed prior to October of his first year in office,150 but the
other twenty-eight of his first-year judicial appointees were confirmed after
October 25, 1981. The fair test for end-of-the-year statistical comparisons
of the type Senator Allen made in October 2001 would be the end of the
year.151 As it turns out, as discussed below, Leahy was able to get twentyeight nominees confirmed by the end of 2001.152
149
147 CONG. REC. S10761 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001). In fact, only fifteen lower-court judges were
confirmed in 1989, Bush I‟s first year in office. There were twenty-seven lower-court confirmations
during Clinton‟s first year; the Supreme Court confirmation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on August
3, 1993, brought the total number of judges to twenty-eight.
150
Ten of those were confirmed in September.
151
Senator Reid picked up on the first-year timing issue—that most first-year nominations are not
approved until late in the year—and made good arguments on that basis. See 147 CONG. REC. S1083233 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 2001). He also added a few of the specious Leahy arguments, detailed above, for
good measure. Id.
152
Given the Senate reorganization, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the anthrax attacks on
Senator Daschle‟s and Leahy‟s offices in November, it was a solid achievement to exceed in 2001 the
number of judges confirmed in 1993 for Clinton by a Democrat-majority Senate, as far as this type of
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Allen also claimed that the 108 vacancies of mid-October 2001 (thirteen
percent of the judiciary) were “the highest [number] in modern history,
except for the extraordinary event in December of 1990 when Congress
created 85 [sic] new positions and, therefore, there were 85 vacancies all at
once.”153 However, there were 108 or more vacancies (peaking at 124 of
642, or 19.3% of the judiciary) for the entire period between March 14 and
November 18, 1981, when Republicans controlled the White House and
the Senate. When seventy-seven new positions were added to the judiciary
on July 10, 1984, the number of vacancies hit 124 and did not fall below
108 until over a year later, on July 22, 1984. Congress did add eighty
positions in December 1990, raising vacancies to 113, but the maximum
vacancies still reached 138 of 811 (17%) before eventually falling below
108 in April of 1992, nearly a year and a half later. Vacancies exceeded
108 during the Clinton administration from April 2, 1993, to November 24,
1993, peaking at 123 before nineteen judges were confirmed on November
22 and November 24, with Democrats controlling the Senate. Vacancies
again hit and exceeded 108 from December 1993 to March 1994.
As the Democrats confirmed more judges in the days following October
15, 2001,154 Senate Republicans perhaps realized that they had made an
error in arguing, as Senator Allen had, that President Bush would not get
an identical number of lower-court nominees confirmed—twenty-seven—
as did President Clinton in his first year. Because Bush II had nominated
many more judges in his first year than previous presidents, it was not the
absolute number of judges confirmed that really mattered to Republicans,
but rather the percentage of judges—and particularly appellate judges—
who received confirmation. For example, in late October 2001 Arlen
Specter put a resolution before the Senate urging the body to confirm
before the end of that year all judges who had been nominated by President

comparison goes. See Noelle Straub, Judicial Gridlock in Senate: Same Story, Different Setting, THE
HILL, Feb. 27, 2001, at 1:
Michael Gerhardt, law professor at the College of William and Mary and author
of The Federal Appointments Process, noted that the Senate Judiciary
Committee faced an unprecedented situation in the past year. Democrats
suddenly took control of the Senate in June and Vermont‟s Patrick Leahy (D)
replaced Utah‟s Orrin Hatch (R) as chairman, and the panel had to expedite
antiterrorism legislation after Sept. 11.
153

147 CONG. REC. S10761 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001). Congress actually added eighty positions,
not eighty-five.
154
Four District Court judges were confirmed on October 23, 2001. See 147 CONG. REC. S1086871 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001).
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Bush before the start of the Senate‟s August recess.155 Specter argued that
this expedited confirmation timeline would be appropriate because 100%
of Reagan‟s and Bush I‟s pre-recess judges had been confirmed by the end
of their first years in office, and 93% of Clinton‟s had been confirmed in
his first year.156 Specter‟s proposed resolution concluded:
It is the sense of the Senate that (1) prior to the end of the
first session of the 107th Congress, the Committee on the
Judiciary shall hold hearings on, and the Committee on the
Judiciary and the full Senate shall have votes on, at a
minimum, the judicial nominations sent to the Senate by
the President prior to August 4, 2001, and (2) the standard
for approving pre-August recess judicial nominations for
past administrations should be the standard for this and
future administrations regardless of political party.157
It is the second clause in the Specter resolution that may prove
interesting to future Congresses. As discussed above,158 given the intense
partisanship that has developed over lower-court judicial positions,
particular those to the Courts of Appeals,159 first-year presidents may in the
future seek confirmation of more early judicial nominees than was the
practice prior to Bush II. If a number of those early nominations are to the
appellate courts, and are perceived by an opposition-led Senate to be
immoderate in political or judicial ideology, it is hard to imagine a Senate
considering and confirming the nominees prior to the end-of-year recess.
This would be a particularly interesting issue if a Democrat were to win the
155
147 CONG. REC. S10927 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001). The resolution was in the form of an
amendment to an appropriations bill, and was immediately ruled non-germane on a point of order from
Senator Reid. Id. at S10928. See also 147 CONG. REC. S12121 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (focusing on unconfirmed appellate nominees). Bush II had nominated forty-four judges
before the August recess of 2001; half of the nominees were to the Courts of Appeals.
156
Id. at S10927.
157
Id.
158
See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing the “Future Shock” relevancy).
159
Regarding the importance of the lower courts, see 147 CONG. REC. S13666 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy):

Lifetime appointments are at stake. The need for careful review is important not
just for Supreme Court nominees but for nominees to the lower Federal courts as
well. These courts hold immense power. Many important legal issues in this
country are decided at the Court of Appeals level, since the Supreme Court
decides fewer than 100 cases per year.
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presidency in 2008 and make early nominations to a Republican Senate
with a Judiciary Committee headed by Senator Specter.160
The first session of the 107th Congress ended in December 2001 with, if
anything, starker divisions between Republicans and Democrats over
judicial nominations compared with earlier months in the year. The
arguments made by both parties remained essentially the same, and
although the Democrats confirmed more lower-court judges for Bush II in
2001 than they did for Clinton in 1993, almost all of the nominees regarded
as “controversial” by the Democrats were left without hearings or votes,
awaiting the second session of the 107th Congress, which began in January
2002.
B. 107th Congress, 2nd Session (2002)
Bush II sent twenty-four nominations, all for District Court positions, to
the Senate in January 2002,161 and partisan skirmishing over judicial
confirmations began in earnest in the Second Session of the 107th
Congress. Leading the way were Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, and Orrin Hatch, the Committee‟s Ranking
Minority Member. And once again much of the rhetoric focused on
statistics regarding delay.
Leahy reported on the status of judicial nominations on January 25,
2002. He began with typical arguments containing versions of the Dog
Days,162 Time Out,163 Hearing Test,164 and Absolute Value165 fallacies. But
Leahy also made some more relevant arguments. He noted that fifty of
160

See also 148 CONG. REC. S1233, S1235 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of Sen. Specter):
I think we ought to declare a truce and sign an armistice agreement that we are
not going to have a repetition of what happened when we had a Democrat in the
White House and Republicans in control of the Judiciary Committee . . . . We
ought to declare this truce and ought to sign this armistice so we take partisan
politics out of the confirmation process of Federal judges.

161
148 CONG. REC. S49 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2002). None by Reagan in January; eleven by Bush I;
nine by Clinton.
162
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S118 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (“Last session we had less than 6
months.”).
163
See, e.g., id. (“By contrast, when my friends on the other side of the aisle took charge of the
Senate in January 1995, until the majority shifted last summer, judicial vacancies rose from 65 to more
than 100, an increase of almost 60 percent.”).
164
See, e.g., id. at S119.
165
See, e.g., id. at S118 (“In just 5 months we went on to confirm 28 additional judges, as I have
said, more than five times the number the White House predicted we would confirm. Think of that,
Mr. President—five times what the White House was telling the American people we would
confirm.”).
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Clinton‟s lower-court nominees received neither a hearing nor committee
vote when the Republicans controlled the Senate from 1995 to 2000, and
even some nominations that led to confirmations had been delayed by
years.166
Leahy also gave two plausible arguments for why unilateral action by
the Bush II administration had caused delays in the 107th Congress‟s
confirmation process. First, the administration ended the practice of
having the American Bar Association review candidates for federal
judgeship prior to their nominations. ABA review started with the
Eisenhower administration and continued uninterrupted for nearly fifty
years through the Clinton administration, but a rising chorus of
conservative critics urged the Bush II administration to drop the practice.167
The Democrat-led Senate Judiciary Committee, however, decided to keep
the ABA involved, and asked for reviews post-nomination. The time
needed for the ABA to complete the reviews generally delayed
consideration of the candidates by the Senate for six to eight weeks.168
Second, Leahy accused the Bush II administration of “disregarding . . .
the longstanding practice that encouraged consultation with home-state
senators, both Republicans and Democrats.”169 Leahy was perhaps
overstating the “longstanding” influence that opposition senators have had
over judicial nominations in their states, however. While it was apparently
the practice of the Republican-led Judiciary Committee during the Clinton
administration to allow a single withheld “blue slip” from a home-state
senator to prevent consideration of a nominee, even from a senator not of
the president‟s party, commentators have reported that the practice was not
so strictly implemented in prior Congresses.170

166
Id. at S119. Sheldon Goldman puts the number of Clinton nominees without hearings at
seventy-six, and counts a total of one hundred lower-court Clinton nominees who were not confirmed
during Republican control of the Senate. Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 252-53. Professor
Goldman‟s numbers treat “renominations” in subsequent Congresses as separate nominations. See
infra note 195.
167
Lewis & Johnston, supra note 63. Perhaps ironically, the ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary had been criticized in earlier times as favoring traditionally successful older white
males as judicial candidates. See Arthur J. Paone & Robert Ira Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal
Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 615, 616 n.5 (1967) (noting
that the Committee “usually recommends only the „Wall Street‟ type lawyer for Federal judgeships”);
Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: A Contemporary Assessment—
Part 2, 66 JUDICATURE 385 (1982).
168
148 CONG. REC. S119 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
169
Id.
170
See Denning, Blue Slip, supra note 15, at 76-87.
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1. Relevancy #4 (―Kind of Blue‖)
The effect given by the Senate Judiciary Committee chairman to the
withholding of a ―blue slip‖ by one or both home-state senators can
determine the success or failure of any particular lower-court judicial
nominee.
In his opening remarks during the Senate debate on January 25, 2002,
Senator Hatch began with the Absolute Value fallacy171 and added the
Time Out fallacy,172 but he also brought up several important issues. First,
he argued that more nominees were “left hanging” without a vote (fiftyfour) at the end of the Bush I presidency, when Democrats controlled the
Senate, than were pending without a vote (forty-one) at the end of the
Clinton presidency, when Republicans controlled the Senate.173 Second,
Hatch brought up the increasingly important point, first raised the previous
year, that twenty-three of Bush II‟s twenty-nine nominees to the Courts of
Appeals had yet to be confirmed.174 He also announced a goal of the
confirmation of at least one hundred judges in 2002, the number confirmed
in 1994, during Clinton‟s second year in office.175
Senator Hatch‟s statistic of nominees “left hanging” without a vote is
one possible measure of Senate obstruction of a president‟s judicial
nominees. However, Hatch‟s statistic leaves out a large category of
nominees who also do not receive Senate votes—those whose names are
withdrawn during the course of the administration and are thus no longer
pending at the end of a presidency. A better measure of obstruction would
also take into account these withdrawn judges. For example, Reagan
171
148 CONG. REC. S117, S121 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (“[T]he overall record makes clear that we
were fair.”).
172
Id. at S124-25. Hatch quoted approvingly from Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s 2001 year-end report
on the federal judiciary, comparing the eighty-two vacancies on the federal courts at the beginning of
1998 with the ninety-nine vacancies at the beginning of 2002. Of course, the Clinton administration
had been appointing judges for five years by 1998, and had overcome some of the delays inherent in
the first year of an administration. A fairer comparison for January 2002 might have been the
beginning of the second year for Clinton, January 1994 (112 vacancies), or even January 1982 (ninetyfour vacancies), the beginning of the second year of the Reagan Administration. Bush I only faced
sixty vacancies at the start of his second year, 1990, but he had begun his presidential term with a
remarkably low thirty-nine vacancies at the start of 1989.
173
Id. at S121. Hatch further argued that, given that some of the nominations in each
administration were made too late to be acted upon by the Senate, the effective numbers left pending
were forty-eight for Bush I and thirty-two for Clinton.
174
Id. at S125. See also 148 CONG. REC. S117, S127 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Nickles) (“The percentage of district court judges has been a good percentage for the number who were
nominated through the summer . . . . On circuit court judges, the record is not quite so good. We have
confirmed six. President Bush has nominated 29.”).
175
Id. at S124.
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appointed 373 lower-court judges in his eight years in office; only twentysix of his nominees were not voted on in the Senate.176 Bush I appointed
184, and did not get votes on fifty-three others.177 Clinton appointed 365
lower-court judges and did not receive votes on sixty-nine others.178
On February 4, 2002, Leahy revisited claims that suffered from the Dog
Days and Time Out fallacies.179 He also spelled out a broader role for the
Senate in advising on potential nominees.180 Leahy chose to emphasize
statistics for trial court nominees, tacit evidence that he recognized that
appellate nominees would be the battleground during the upcoming year.181
Hatch‟s rejoinder to Leahy‟s speech was also a re-airing of past claims,
with the Absolute Value,182 Dog Days,183 and Time Out184 fallacies given
prominence. Hatch again focused on delays in circuit court nominations.
He also defended the Bush II administration‟s work with home-state
senators in the nomination process185 and noted that some of the Clinton
nominees that had been held up for long periods of time lacked home-state
senatorial support.186
Both Leahy and Hatch returned to their basic judicial-confirmation
“stump speeches” on February 11.187 However, Hatch‟s speech of March

176
At some point in the process, nominations are made too late in the election cycle to be acted
upon by the Senate. Using a date of July 1 as a cutoff does not change the numbers very much. Only
one of the failed Reagan nominations was made after July 1, 1988. Six additional Reagan nominees
were eventually confirmed after renomination during the Bush I administration. See supra note 93.
177
Ten of the failed Bush I nominations were made after July 1, 1992.
178
Thirteen of the failed Clinton nominations were made after July 1, 2000.
179
148 CONG. REC. S276- (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002). Leahy inserted a similar speech the next day.
See 148 CONG. REC. S319-20 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2002).
180
148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (“The most progress can be made most quickly if
the White House would begin working with home-State Senators to identify fair-minded,
nonideological, consensus nominees to fill these court vacancies.”).
181
Id. (“In the last 5 months of last year, the Senate confirmed a higher percentage of the
President‟s trial court nominees, 22 out of 36, than a Republican majority had confirmed in the first
session of either of the last two Congresses with a Democratic President.”).
182
148 CONG. REC. S341 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2002).
183
Id. at S341.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
148 CONG. REC. S582-83 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2002). Leahy repeated his basic claims on
February 15, February 26, and March 12. See 148 CONG. REC. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002); 148
CONG. REC. S1138 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S894 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2002).
Different versions of the basic Leahy speech can also be found at 148 CONG. REC. S3338-40 (daily ed.
Apr. 25, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S3143 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2932-33 (daily ed.
Apr. 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2758 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2661-62 (daily ed.
Apr. 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2200 (Mar. 21, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S1998 (daily ed. Mar. 18,
2002). Hatch was less repetitive, but occasionally restated his basic points. See 148 CONG. REC.
S7456 (daily ed. July 29, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7019 (daily ed. July 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC.
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12 was much more pointed, focusing exclusively on the circuit courts, and
it signaled a new push from Republicans on judicial nominations. Senator
Hatch‟s emphasis coincided with the Judiciary Committee‟s hearing on the
nomination of Judge Thomas Pickering to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Hatch argued that there were currently
thirty-one vacancies on the Courts of Appeals (“far higher than the
Republicans ever let it reach”), while there had never been more than
twenty-one at the end of any year in President Clinton‟s first term. He also
pointed out that circuit court vacancies totaled only eighteen, fourteen, and
twenty-five at the end of the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses,
respectively.188 And he argued that eight of sixteen positions on the Sixth
Circuit, and four of twelve on the D.C. Circuit, sat vacant despite pending
nominations.
Hatch‟s points were mostly well-taken. The thirty-one vacancies in the
circuit courts were a high number relative to other times, although twentyfive of the vacancies had been inherited from the Clinton administration.
However, the story of the Sixth Circuit and D.C. Circuit vacancies was
perhaps more complex than Hatch represented. Four of the Sixth Circuit
vacancies had been unfilled for at least the entire last year of the Clinton
administration, 2000, and one had been open since May 1, 1995.189
Similarly, two of the D.C. Circuit vacancies had existed since August 1996
and November 1999. Moreover, during the Clinton administration, some
Republicans had objected to filling the two D.C. Circuit vacancies because,
in their estimation, the court did not need more than ten judges.190
Following the party-line defeat of Thomas Pickering‟s Fifth Circuit
nomination in the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 14, 2002,191
Senate Republicans determined to highlight what they perceived as
breakdowns in the judicial nomination process. Senator Trent Lott, the
S6794 (daily ed. July 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2936-37 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC.
S2201 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002).
188
148 CONG. REC. S1739 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002).
189
See Ghosts Of Nominations Past: Setting The Record Straight: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Oversight of the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18-22 (2002)
(testimony of Kent Markus, Professor, Capital University Law School).
190
Amy Goldstein & Neely Tucker, Bush Plans To Add 2 Judges to Key Court; Senate GOP for
Years Blocked Filling All Seats, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2002. at A01; Saundra Torry & Toni Locy, In
Rocky Session, Judge of U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. Confirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at A14
(“Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), a conservative elected to the Senate in November [argued] that it would
be a „rip-off‟ of taxpayers to allow the court to have more than 10 judges.”).
191
The Committee voted ten to nine against the nomination and ten to nine against sending the
nomination to the floor without a recommendation. Helen Dewar & Amy Goldstein, Appeals Court
Choice Rejected; Senate Panel Hands Bush 1st Defeat on Judicial Nomination, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2002, at A01.
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Senate Minority Leader and Pickering‟s main supporter, attributed the
nominee‟s defeat in part to Democrats‟ desire for payback for slow judicial
confirmations during the Clinton administration.192 Lott echoed a
frequently-made Republican claim about the Clinton years: “[T]he
Judiciary Committee under the Republicans didn‟t kill a single nominee
during the Clinton years in the committee. We did defeat one of them, but
we first reported him out of the committee and then defeated him on the
floor with a recorded vote.”193
Lott was understandably upset over the defeat of the nomination of a
close friend, but it is hard to believe he could make this claim with a
straight face. The Judiciary Committee during the 104th to 106th
Congresses—the last six years of Clinton‟s presidency—may not have
killed a Clinton nominee by vote of the committee, but the Committee
nonetheless frequently defeated nominees by the arguably less
commendable method of simply not giving the nominee a hearing or
vote.194 According to Professor Sheldon Goldman‟s calculations, during
the final six years of the Clinton administration, while Senator Hatch
chaired the Judiciary Committee, twenty-eight of seventy-nine appellate
nominees received no hearings, along with forty-eight of the 262 district
court nominees.195

192
148 CONG. REC. S1916 (daily ed. Mar., 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“This is a „We will
show you; you didn‟t always move our nominees‟ payback.”); see also id. at S1923-24 (statement of
Sen. Kyl) (“There is also a very significant undercurrent of retribution.”).
193
Id. at S1916. Hatch has made the same argument many times. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S2201
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (“[D]uring the 6 years that Republicans controlled the Senate during the
Clinton administration, not once was one of his judicial nominations killed by a committee vote.”); see
also 147 CONG. REC. S10763 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sessions). Senator Lott also
offered a “Sense of the Senate” resolution which recited many Republican claims regarding judicial
nominations. Id. at S1917.
194
See generally supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text (discussing the veto-gates that can kill
nominations—committee inaction, holds, and blue slips).
195
Goldman, Unpicking, supra note 15, at 709, 712. See also 148 CONG. REC. S1924 (daily ed.
Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Only one judge was defeated on the floor of the Senate, and I
do not think any were defeated in the committee, as Judge Pickering was today. But there were some
judges who did not get a hearing. Maybe there were too many.”). Professor Goldman counts people
nominated for the same judicial vacancy in more than one Congress as separate nominations. Senator
Hatch generally counts the same such multiple nominations as single nominations only, so he claims
that fewer nominees failed to receive hearings. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14,
2002). The consideration of persons nominated for the same position in successive Congresses is a
difficult issue, because it also affects the number of days that a nominee is “pending” before the Senate.
When complaining of delay in the process, both parties generally count from the date of the first
nomination to the date of the final action—even if in another Congress and thus technically a different
nomination—in calculating how long the Senate took to consider a particular nominee.
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2. Fallacy #5 (―Killing Floor‖)
Failure to acknowledge nominations that never received a hearing or
vote at the committee level when tallying the number of nominations
―defeated‖ in a particular Congress.
On March 14, Senator Hatch also offered a comprehensive defense of
his Committee‟s performance during the final six years of the Clinton
administration. He specifically addressed the large number of nominees
who had received no hearings:
There were only 68 Article III Judicial nominees who were
nominated by President Clinton, in all of his 8 years, who
did not get confirmed. Of those, 3 were left at the end of
the 103rd Congress, when the Democrats controlled the
Senate. That leaves 65. Of those, 12 were withdrawn by
the President, leaving 53. Nine were nominated too late
for the Congress and committee to act on them or they
were lacking paperwork. That leaves 44. Now, 17 of
those lacked home state support, which was often the
result of a lack of consultation with home State Senators.
There was no way to confirm them without ignoring the
senatorial courtesy that we afford to home State Senators
in the nomination process. That left 27. One nominee was
defeated on the floor, which leaves only 26 remaining
nominees.196
Hatch‟s numbers here are in large measure correct,197 and his narration
provides nuanced insight into how the Judiciary Committee considers
judicial nominations and demonstrates how difficult it is to compare
nomination statistics from different time periods. As discussed above, a
nomination can fail for any number of reasons, not all of which are the
“fault” of the Judiciary Committee or its chairman. Hatch does not spell
196
148 CONG. REC. S1919 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002). And this coming from the same Senator with
an avowed antipathy for “statistical judo!” See supra note 1 (citing “statistical judo”).
197
The Senate library nominations database shows sixty-nine Clinton judicial nominations not
acted upon, five of which were from the 103rd Congress, 1993 to 1994. Eighteen of the sixty-nine
failed nominees were nominated in at least two sessions of Congress, so Democratic lawmakers
sometimes claim a greater number of failed nominations. Twenty-two of the sixty-nine were circuit
court nominees, and nine of those were nominated in multiple Congresses. Because blue slips and
holds were private during the Hatch years, Hatch‟s claims cannot be evaluated in their entirety.
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out when a nomination would be made “too late” to be considered, but
looking back over previous election years we see successful nominations in
presidential election years as late as September 28, 1984; August 3, 1988;
September 17, 1992; June 6, 1996; July 21, 2000; and July 22, 2004.
Hatch also returned to arguments he had made previously198 comparing
the Clinton confirmation record with that of the Bush I administration: “So
the argument that this all began because the Republicans were unfair to
Clinton nominees is simply untrue. We were not. I was more fair to
Clinton in confirming nominees than the Democrats were to President
George H.W. Bush.”199 While many Democrats would take exception with
any argument that Hatch was fair to Clinton nominees, his point about
Democrats stalling with Bush I‟s nominees is important. As Professor
Goldman has shown, significant obstruction and delay in the judicial
confirmation process actually first appeared during 1988 and 1992, both
presidential election years when Republicans controlled the White House
and Democrats controlled the Senate. As Goldman explains, “But with the
situation reversed with a Democrat in the White House and the
Republicans in control of the Senate, the evidence clearly shows that the
Republicans ratcheted up obstruction and delay, with all-time records [of
nomination delays] for the district and appeals courts . . . .”200
Hatch concluded with versions of the Dog Days and Time Out
fallacies.201 Arguing specifically about the circuit courts, he claimed:
Taking numbers by the end of each Congress, a
Republican-controlled Senate has never-never-left as many
circuit court vacancies as currently exist today. At the end
of the 104th Congress, the number was 18. At the end of
the 105th Congress, that number was 14, and even at the
end of the 106th Congress, a Presidential election year,
that number was only 25. Today there are 31 vacancies in
the circuit courts.202
If Hatch had waited until the end of 2002, a more appropriate date for
comparison, he would have found that the number of circuit court
vacancies had declined to twenty-five. But, importantly, twelve of those
198

See supra notes 162-70 (discussing January 25, 2002).
148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002).
200
Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15 at 256-57.
201
148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002).
202
Id.
199
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spots had been vacant for at least one year under Clinton and were thus
particularly difficult for some Democrats to accept being filled with
Republican nominees. As Senator Leahy argued, “This is a case of the
arsonist coming forward and saying: We need a better fire department
around here. Look at all these buildings that are burning down. All these
vacancies were there because Republicans refused to hold hearings on the
Court of Appeals nominees.”203 In comparison, at the end of 1994, with
Democrats in both the White House and Senate, there were fifteen
appellate vacancies, only five of which were held over from Bush I.
Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, took a new
tack in late March 2002, arguing that nominees for the Sixth Circuit had
been pending for too long without votes. He pointed to one judge pending
for ninety-three days; three for 134 days; another for 164 days; and two
more for “an incredible 317 days” each.204 While 317 days, or even
ninety-three, might seem like a long time to those uninitiated in the
vagaries of the judicial confirmation process, McConnell‟s comment only
invited Democratic reminders of the much longer wait times that many
Clinton nominees faced before ultimate action—confirmation, rejection, or
return to the President—under the Republican-led Senate. Indeed, Senator
Leahy had the numbers at hand: “I think of Helene White [a 1997 Clinton
nominee to the Sixth Circuit]. She waited 1,454 days. I do not recall a
single Member of the Republican Party saying should she not at least have
a hearing; even if we vote her down, should she not at least have a hearing.
She did not even have a hearing or a vote in the committee; 1,454 days, not
a word.”205
203
148 CONG. REC. S2759 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also 148 CONG.
REC. S2206 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer):

Well, a problem cannot be created and then the complaint made that someone
else is not solving it fast enough. That is the height of unfairness. That is the
height of sophistry . . . . Do not make the argument about vacancies that you
have created unless you are prepared to make this a partnership to fill those
vacancies.
See also id. at S3549 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Reid) (comparing Republicans to
the perpetrator of matricide and patricide who asks his sentencing judge for leniency on account of his
status as an orphan).
204
148 CONG. REC. S2205 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (“Jeffrey Sutton and Deborah Cook were
nominated an incredible 317 days ago with no hearings on any of these nominees.”). Sutton and Cook
were two of Bush II‟s first nominations, made on May 9, 2001. Those nominations were returned to
the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, supra note 50, on August 3,
2001, due to the Senate‟s summer recess. Bush then renominated the candidates on September 4, 2001,
and the nominations were held over rather than returned during the winter break of 2001-2002.
205
148 CONG. REC. S2215 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002). He continued:
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Perhaps chastened,206 McConnell came back the next month with a new
argument, albeit one afflicted by the Dog Days and Time Out fallacies.
His argument was simple: “[A]t least eighty-six percent of circuit court
nominees from the administration of President Jimmy Carter through
President Bill Clinton got a full Senate vote,”207 but only seven of twentynine Bush II circuit court nominees had received votes thus far in the 107th
Congress. The problem, of course, was that the Congress still had more
than eight months to run. Reagan got nineteen appellate judges confirmed
in his first Congress, but ten of them were confirmed from March to
December of his second year in office. Bush I had twenty-two appellate
judges confirmed in his first Congress, but seventeen were confirmed
between March and December of his second year in office. For Clinton,
sixteen of the nineteen appellate judges confirmed during his first Congress
were confirmed from March to December of his second year in office. Ten
more Bush II appellate nominees, of the thirty-one he nominated during his
first Congress, were ultimately confirmed in 2002. Though still not as
many or as high a percentage of appellate judges were confirmed for Bush
II as for his predecessors, the circuit-court confirmation numbers from
Bush II‟s first Congress ended up substantially greater than those
suggested by McConnell‟s premature argument.
Senator Leahy‟s comments on April 25, 2001, show his continued focus
on aggressively raising what this article characterizes as the Dog Days and
Time Out fallacies:
I look at the other qualified nominees we had to wait for. There was another one,
Fifth Circuit. H. Alston Johnson waited 602 days, no hearing. There was James
Duffy, Ninth Circuit, 546 days, no hearing. And Kathleen McCree Lewis,
extraordinarily competent attorney, daughter of one of the most respected
solicitors general ever in this country, she waited 455 days and never received a
hearing. There was Kent Markus of the Sixth Circuit who waited 309 days under
the Republicans and never got a hearing. And Robert Cindrich of the Third
Circuit who never received a hearing in over 300 days.
Then there were the nominations that were held up without a hearing such as
Judge James Beaty who waited 1,033 days, no hearing. James Wynn, Fourth
Circuit, 497 days, no hearing. Enrique Moreno, Fifth Circuit, waited 455 days,
never got a hearing. Jorge Rangel, the Fifth Circuit, 454 days, never received a
hearing.
Allen Snyder, the D.C. Circuit; now I will give them credit, he waited 449 days
and finally did get a hearing. Of course, they never brought it to a vote in the
committee, but he did receive a hearing. He and Bonnie Campbell, the former
Iowa Attorney General had hearings but never were on the Committee agenda
for a vote.
206
Though not too much; McConnell made essentially the same argument about delay on April 16,
2002. 148 CONG. REC. S2692 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002).
207
148 CONG. REC. S2601 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2002).
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With today‟s votes, the total number of Federal judges
confirmed since the change in Senate majority will now be
50. As our action today demonstrates, again, we are
moving to confirm President Bush‟s nominees at a faster
pace than the nominees of prior presidents. It took almost
14 months for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees
for the Reagan administration. It took more than 15
months for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees for
the Clinton administration. And it took nearly 18 months
for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees for the
George H.W. Bush administration.208
Because of the Senate changeover in mid-2001, Leahy simply did not
count the first seven months of that year. But, as shown above, very few
judges, if any, would have been confirmed in the early months of the Bush
II presidency regardless of party control in the Senate. If the full fifteen
months of the 107th Congress are counted, one sees from Leahy‟s own
numbers that in April 2002 the Senate was on an average pace for
confirmation of Bush II‟s first fifty judges.209
As May 9, 2002, the first anniversary of Bush II‟s first eleven circuit
court judge nominations, approached, the Republicans began to more
aggressively make judicial confirmations an issue. At the end of April,
Senator Hatch laid out the new battle plan:
The most important measure of performance should be
how we are handling the most important courts: the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Let‟s compare the treatment of
President Bush‟s first 11 circuit court nominees to the first
11 of previous presidents . . . . [After nearly 365 days]
208

148 CONG. REC. S3418 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2002).
Leahy repeated this fallacy throughout the remainder of the 107 th Congress. See 148 CONG.
REC. S11522 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S11306-S11308 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2002);
148 CONG. REC. S11206 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S11047 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002);
148 CONG. REC. S10344-S10347 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S9975-S9977 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S9896-S9897 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8958 (daily
ed. Sept. 20, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8664 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8511 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8448 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7808, S7813 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7452S7457 (daily ed. July 29, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7397 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); 148 CONG. REC.
S7017-S7019 (daily ed. July 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S6795 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (explaining
that the two-month delay since the most recent confirmation was due to disagreement between
administration and Senate leadership over appointments to bipartisan boards and commissions); 148
CONG. REC. S3522 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002).
209
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only 3 of the President‟s first 11 nominees are confirmed.
Is this what the Democratic leadership considers a recordbreaking pace? It may be record-breaking, all right, but
not the record they‟re talking about. They are confirming
with the velocity of molasses.210
Hatch unfavorably compared this 2001 record to that of the first eleven
circuit court nominees for Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton, all of whom had
been confirmed within a year of nomination.211 This was true, though as
explained above the first eleven circuit court nominations of these earlier
presidents were made over an extended period of time, extending into the
second years of their administrations, rather than in one block at the very
beginning of “confirmation season.”212
Senator Reid countered Senator Hatch by noting that five of the eleven
vacancies which Bush II sought to fill were for positions that had been
unfilled for at least a year or more during the Clinton administration.213
This was true, and Reid perhaps even undersold his point. In fact, eight of
the eleven Bush II nominations were to positions that had been vacant
since 1999 or earlier, with one stretching all the way back to 1990, during
the Bush I administration. But Reid did not tell the full story: many of the
vacancies filled by Clinton‟s first eleven appointments had also been held
unfilled for over a year at the end of the Bush I administration. This is a
function of the Four Corners relevancy, which is embraced by each party
during different time periods depending on who controls the political
branches.
Finally, on May 9, 2002, the Republicans fully opened their offensive
on judicial nominations. Speaking for the Republicans on the Senate floor
were Senators Hatch, Thompson, Voinovich, Grassley, Frist, Hutchinson,
Hutchison, DeWine, Allard, Lott, McConnell, Brownback, Nickles,
Santorum, and Kyl.214 Senator Hatch set out the main arguments for the
Republicans. He dragged out his familiar Absolute Value fallacy and
repeated his arguments about the number of nominees pending without a

210

148 CONG. REC. S3528-29 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002). See also id. at S3545 (statement of Sen.

Kyl).
211

Id. at S3528.
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
148 CONG. REC. S3549 (daily ed. May 9, 2002).
214
See id. at S4089-S4132 (daily ed. May 9, 2002). Senators Leahy, Reid, Durbin, and Feingold
answered on behalf of the Democrats, using arguments substantially similar to those made and
discussed before.
212
213
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vote at the end of the Bush I and Clinton presidencies.215 He again
compared confirmation results for the first eleven circuit court nominees
under the past four administrations.216 Finally, Hatch introduced a new
argument comparing the success of the first hundred judicial nominees
under the past few administrations: Clinton, ninety-seven of one hundred
confirmed in an average of ninety-three days; Bush I, ninety-five of one
hundred confirmed in an average of seventy-eight days; Reagan, ninetyseven of one hundred in an average of thirty-six days. Bush II, only fiftytwo of one hundred confirmed in an average of 150 days so far.217
Senator Leahy in July 2002 showed the other way to interpret these
numbers, essentially by invoking a variation of the Future Shock
relevancy: while the Reagan and Bush I judges were confirmed at a high
rate and relatively quickly following their nominations, the hundredth
judge for each president was not nominated or confirmed until well within
their third year in office.218 In other words, Bush II had nominated many
more judges far more quickly than his Republican predecessors. However,
Leahy did not mention that Clinton had gotten his first hundred judges
considered by late September of his second year in office, in 1994.
As the 107th Congress drew to a close, Republicans were finally in a
position to make comparisons based on the success of judicial nominees
over the entire two-year period. The focus was again on appellate court
nominees. On October 3, 2002, Senator McConnell laid out the relevant
statistics:
[In 1981-1982] President Reagan submitted 20
nominations for the circuit court, and 19 of them were
confirmed—95 percent. President Reagan, of course, had
a Republican Senate during those 2 years. President
George Bush in his first 2 years, when his party did not
control the Senate . . . submitted 23 circuit court
nominations, and 22 of them were confirmed—96-percent
. . . . With regard to President Clinton in his first 2 years, a
period during which his party did control the Senate, he
submitted 22 circuit court nominations, and 19 were
confirmed. That is an 86-percent confirmation rate . . . .
Then we look at the first 2 years of the presidency of
215

See discussion supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
217
148 CONG. REC. S4094 (daily ed. May 9, 2002).
218
Id. at S6704 (daily ed. July 12, 2002).
216
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George W. Bush, which is now coming to a conclusion.
We are near the end now where the statistics actually mean
something. President George W. Bush has submitted 32
circuit court nominations to the Senate, and only 14 have
been confirmed, which is 44 percent. Forty-four percent.
This is the worst record in anybody‟s memory of
confirming circuit court nominations of a President in his
first 2 years.219
Ultimately, only seventeen of the Bush II circuit court nominations
during the 107th Congress were confirmed within that two-year period.
Fifteen other nominations were returned to the president at the end of the
session. The district court statistics were much better, with eighty-three of
ninety-eight nominees (84.7%) confirmed, but this percentage was still not
as good as other presidents had done in their first two years, though
Reagan and Clinton had benefited from Senates controlled by their own
parties.220 During the Clinton years that Republicans controlled the Senate,
district court nominees fared worse than they did under Bush II, but for
perhaps the most comparable period,221 the 105th Congress (1997-98), the
numbers were essentially the same, with seventy-nine of ninety-four
nominees (84.0%) confirmed.222
IV. RESOLVING THE “PROBLEM?”
Though this article has focused on categorizing and evaluating Senate
rhetoric on judicial confirmation statistics in the 107th Congress, I will also
offer a few normative thoughts on some of the Senate‟s institutional
practices that contribute to delay in the nomination and confirmation
process. First, the Constitution arguably neither requires nor prohibits
much in the way of formal or informal Senate procedure with respect to the

219

148 CONG. REC. S9863-64 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2002).
Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 253. Statistics for the approval rates of presidents‟
district court nominees during their first Congress are as follows: Reagan, sixty-eight of sixty-nine
(98.6%); Bush I, forty-eight of fifty (96%); Clinton, 107 of 118 (90.7%). Id.
221
The period was comparable because it followed a presidential election year. Thus many
nominations had been held up for months prior to resumption of activity by the Judiciary Committee.
On the other hand, the comparison is not entirely apposite because the Judiciary Committee in 1997
would have had completed files for many of the re-nominated Clinton judicial candidates.
222
Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 253. For the 104th Congress, the record of district court
nominees was sixty-two of eighty-five (72.9%), and for the 106th (leading up to the 2000 election), the
record of district court nominees was fifty-seven of eighty-three (68.7%). Id.
220
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judicial confirmation process.223 Instead, the contours of the process are
deliberately left for the political branches to determine.
Even so, the Senate could make procedural changes that would make
the judicial confirmation process more democratically legitimate. In
particular, individual actions that prevent collective action on nominations
should be much more limited than in current practice. Specific examples
of individual tactics subject to misuse include: the blue-slip, especially
when it is anonymous, and when it is treated by the Judiciary Committee
chairman as an absolute bar on Committee consideration of a nominee; the
hold, when implemented for other than the traditional reason of delaying
Senate action for a brief period in order to give a Senator a chance to study
an issue or to ensure a senator‟s presence during a vote;224 or any other
extended delays unilaterally imposed by the Judiciary Committee chairman
or Majority Leader. On the other hand, a filibuster of a judicial nominee
by the minority party in the Senate might be appropriate in narrow cases.225
A regime that disallows individual disruptions of the judicial
appointments process, while preserving the right to filibuster, would force
the president to appoint more broadly-acceptable judges. When the
opposition party controls the Senate, all but the most controversial
nominees would get quick votes because the institutional individual delay
mechanisms that favor the majority would be prohibited. If the Senate
majority leadership cannot marshal votes within its own caucus to defeat
the nominees of an opposition president, the leadership should not be
allowed to reach that result through non-public procedures. When the
president‟s party controls the Senate, all but the most mainstream
nominees should get quick votes, subject only to filibuster of the most
controversial nominees. Such a filibuster would require a public and
223
A great deal of interesting scholarship has been produced on this issue—far too much to cover
here. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970). For present purposes, it is enough that “advice and consent” is not defined in
the Constitution, and that actions by the first Senate showed an original understanding that included
Senate rejection of a federal executive appointee on parochial grounds. See supra note 31. If
anything, Senate power with respect to lifetime-tenured judges should arguably be greater. See also
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”).
224
For example, separate actions by Senators Byrd and Inhofe holding all judicial appointments to
protest particular recess appointments, and actions by Michigan senators to hold all of Bush II‟s Sixth
Circuit nominees. Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I am
encouraged that this confirmation today was not delayed by extended, unexplained, anonymous holds
on the Senate Executive Calendar, the type of hold that characterized so much of the previous 6-1⁄2
years.”).
225
Defining precisely what cases are appropriate for filibuster is impossible in the abstract, and is
appropriately left to the political process. As writers have observed in other contexts, sunlight is the
best disinfectant. Forcing a public filibuster allows public pressure to be applied in a way that it cannot
be when individual holds are allowed.
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concerted effort by forty or more senators, not an individually-instigated
backroom deal.
There is obviously a great deal of play in defining what is “mainstream”
or which judicial nominees are “controversial,” but such issues will be
appropriately worked out in the very public political process of debating
and voting on nominees. By restricting individual contumaciousness, the
confirmation process would be much more transparent, and it would be
easier to make a valid campaign issue out of either party‟s failure to
confirm judges. Moreover, senatorial debate could focus on the merits of
individual judges and might be less susceptible to the fallacies pointed out
in this article. When individual senators are not able to subvert the
confirmation process in private, moderate nominees who enjoy the support
of a Senate majority—even when the nomination has been made by an
opposition president—will not be easily blocked.
The problem with this and other proposals for reform is that they
require implementation by the majority party at the very time that it has
gained control of the Senate‟s advice-and-consent apparatus.
A
determined Judiciary Committee chairman could effect blue-slip reform,
through an extension of the agreement that Hatch and Leahy memorialized
in the Congressional Record in June 2001, but modification of the hold
procedure would require the actions of the Majority Leader. Formalizing
any agreement through Senate Rule or statute could make the agreement
binding on future Senates.
V. CONCLUSION
The 107th Congress, covering the years 2001 and 2002, was a
particularly interesting period with respect to the increasingly contentious
battleground of lower-court judicial nominations. In arguing about the
progress—or lack thereof—of judicial confirmations, during this time
senators on both sides of the political aisle frequently made statistics-laden
comparisons to the Senate‟s confirmations performance in previous
Congresses. This article has shown that the majority of these numerical
comparisons, made by both Democrats and Republicans, suffered from an
identifiable set of fallacies. Awareness of these fallacies by participants in
the confirmations process, in addition to critics, scholars, the media and the
public at large, may serve to steer future argument away from irrelevant
numerical comparisons and toward more legitimate and merit-based
consideration of judicial nominees.

